[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
[freehaven-cvs] reorganization of the beginning and end
Update of /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/fc03
In directory moria.seul.org:/home/arma/work/freehaven/doc/fc03
Modified Files:
econymics.bib econymics.tex
Log Message:
reorganization of the beginning and end
Index: econymics.bib
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/fc03/econymics.bib,v
retrieving revision 1.3
retrieving revision 1.4
diff -u -d -r1.3 -r1.4
--- econymics.bib 13 Sep 2002 20:05:48 -0000 1.3
+++ econymics.bib 14 Sep 2002 03:12:55 -0000 1.4
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@
booktitle = {Financial Cryptography (FC '02)},
year = 2002,
editor = {Matt Blaze},
- publisher = {Springer Verlag, LNCS (forthocoming)},
+ publisher = {Springer Verlag, LNCS (forthcoming)},
note = {\newline \url{http://www.freehaven.net/papers.html}}
}
Index: econymics.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/fc03/econymics.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.7
retrieving revision 1.8
diff -u -d -r1.7 -r1.8
--- econymics.tex 13 Sep 2002 20:05:48 -0000 1.7
+++ econymics.tex 14 Sep 2002 03:12:55 -0000 1.8
@@ -5,19 +5,12 @@
\usepackage{graphicx}
\usepackage{amsmath}
-
%\textwidth16cm
%\textheight21cm
%\topmargin0mm
%\oddsidemargin2.5mm
%\evensidemargin2.5mm
-%\textwidth=7in
-%\textheight=10in
-%\topmargin=-1.2in
-%\oddsidemargin .35in
-%\evensidemargin .35in
-
\begin{document}
%\newcounter{axiomctr}
@@ -67,8 +60,6 @@
Comment*****************} }
}
-
-
\newcommand{\workingnote}[1]{} % The version that hides the note.
%\newcommand{\workingnote}[1]{(**#1)} % The version that makes the note visible.
@@ -88,12 +79,9 @@
Naval Research Lab
\email{(syverson@itd.nrl.navy.mil)}}
-
-
\maketitle
-\pagestyle{myheadings} \markboth{Towards an Econymics, Draft \today}{Towards an Econymics, Draft \today}
-
-
+%\pagestyle{myheadings} \markboth{Towards an Econymics, Draft \today}{Towards an Econymics, Draft \today}
+\pagestyle{plain}
\begin{abstract}
@@ -107,14 +95,14 @@
\end{abstract}
-Keywords: anonymity, economics, incentives, reputation
+Keywords: anonymity, economics, incentives, decentralized, reputation
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
-\section{Introduction and motivation}
+\section{Introduction}
+\label{sec:intro}
Anonymity in communication over public networks such as the Internet
-%has received a lot of technical attention and
is widely (though not
uncontroversially) regarded as both desirable and necessary. People
want to be able to surf the Web, purchase online, send email, etc.\
@@ -130,15 +118,11 @@
uncharted, and we can also point to the current economic environment in
general. However, this is not the whole story.
-Single-hop web proxies like the Anonymizer do seem sufficient to protect
+Single-hop web proxies like the Anonymizer can probably protect
end users from simple threats like profile-creating websites.
-%Thus users
-%who want anonymity and are happy with the Anonymizer decrease the market
-%share of the stronger anonymity systems.
-A limitation of such commercial proxies is that they must be trusted
+On the other hand, such commercial proxies must be trusted
completely with respect to protecting traffic information.
-Many users, particularly
-large organizations, would be rightly
+Many users, particularly large organizations, would be rightly
hesitant to use an anonymity infrastructure they do not control.
However, a system that carries traffic for only one organization does
not provide much protection at all --- it must carry traffic from
@@ -150,15 +134,27 @@
benefit from this decentralized model, because they can be confident
that a few colluding nodes are unlikely to uncover their anonymity.
-More generally, anonymity systems use messages to hide messages. So
-from an anonymity perspective, users are always better off going where
-the noise is provided.
-% Whether or not people do so intentionally,
-% what does this clause mean, paul? -RD
-There may be good anonymity reasons for having fewer
-providers. Also note that a sender is both a
-consumer and provider of anonymity. We will return to both of these
-points below.
+However, nobody really wants to run one of these; exit abuse; free
+loading; etc. [Expand]
+
+Here we explore the incentives of participants to both offer and use
+anonymity services. We aim to set a foundation for understanding and
+clarifying our speculations about the influences and interactions based
+on these incentives. Section \ref{sec:overview} gives an overview of the
+ideas behind our model, and Section \ref{sec:model} goes on to detail
+a variety of (often conflicting) incentives and build a general model
+to incorporate many of them. We then bring to light some simplifying
+assumptions in Section \ref{sec:application} and draw conclusions
+about certain scenarios. Sections \ref{sec:alternate-incentives} and
+\ref{sec:roadblocks} describe some alternate approaches and problems we
+encounter in designing and deploying strong anonymity systems.
+
+\section{An Economics of Anonymity}
+\label{sec:overview}
+
+Anonymity systems use messages to hide messages --- senders are both
+consumers and providers of anonymity. From an anonymity perspective,
+users are always better off going where the noise is provided.
High traffic is necessary for strong anonymity. High traffic and
better performance complement each other: a system that processes only
@@ -185,9 +181,8 @@
but this has simply not been recognized or been given a viable business
model.
-Here we explore the incentives of agents to both
-offer and use anonymity services. We aim to set a foundation for
-understanding speculations such as those above. We will primarily
+
+We will primarily
focus on the strategic motivations of honest agents. However, the
motivations of dishonest agents are at least as important. For
example, note that an anonymity-breaking adversary with an adequate
@@ -203,7 +198,6 @@
part of a given \emph{adversary}, a context within which strategic
agents must operate.
-\section{An Economics of Anonymity}
alessandrocomment\{I feel that, possibly, even more
of the material that you guys had already written could be used for a
@@ -217,6 +211,7 @@
preliminary applications of the views we are presenting here.\}
\section{Analytic Framework}
+\ref{sec:model}
We study the incentives for agents to send messages anonymously through
mix-net like systems.
@@ -396,6 +391,7 @@
reliability differently.
\section{Application}
+\label{sec:application}
The above system is a very general overview of economic issues related to
the \textit{actual} use of \textit{actual} anonymous systems. As it is, such
@@ -723,7 +719,7 @@
a clear solution to the problem. Another potential solution, a global
PKI to ensure unique identities, is unlikely to emerge any time soon.
-\subsection{Usability: customization and preferential service are risky too}
+\subsection{Customization and preferential service are risky too}
Leaving security decisions up to the user is traditionally a way to foist
cost or liability from the vendor to the customer; but in strong anonymity
@@ -740,6 +736,9 @@
customize or optimize their client's behavior. We can't even let users pay
for better service or preferential treatment --- the hordes in the coach
seats are probably better off anonymity-wise than those in first class.
+
+\subsection{Usability}
+
However, ``in anonymity systems usability, efficiency, reliability and
cost become \emph{security} objectives because they affect the size of the
user base which in turn affects the degree of anonymity it is possible
@@ -785,3 +784,4 @@
\bibliography{econymics}
\end{document}
+
***********************************************************************
To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majordomo@seul.org with
unsubscribe freehaven-cvs in the body. http://freehaven.net/