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[freehaven-cvs] margin games and patches. we"re a good length now.



Update of /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/fc03
In directory moria.seul.org:/home/arma/work/freehaven/doc/fc03

Modified Files:
	econymics.bib econymics.pdf econymics.ps econymics.tex 
Log Message:
margin games and patches. we're a good length now.


Index: econymics.bib
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/fc03/econymics.bib,v
retrieving revision 1.10
retrieving revision 1.11
diff -u -d -r1.10 -r1.11
--- econymics.bib	16 Sep 2002 17:39:33 -0000	1.10
+++ econymics.bib	17 Sep 2002 02:37:55 -0000	1.11
@@ -56,7 +56,6 @@
   year =         2001,
   editor =       {Ira Moskowitz},
   publisher =    {Springer-Verlag, LNCS 2137},
-  note =        {\newline \url{http://www.freehaven.net/papers.html}},
 }
 
 @InProceedings{casc-rep,
@@ -66,7 +65,6 @@
   year =         2002,
   editor =       {Matt Blaze},
   publisher =    {Springer Verlag, LNCS (forthcoming)},
-   note =        {\newline \url{http://www.freehaven.net/papers.html}}
 }
 
 @Article{fudenberg88,
@@ -170,7 +168,6 @@
   year =	 2002,
   editor =	 {Fabien Petitcolas},
   publisher =	 {Springer-Verlag, LNCS (forthcoming)},
-  note =         {\url{http://www.freehaven.net/papers.html}}
 }
 
 @InProceedings{sybil,

Index: econymics.pdf
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/fc03/econymics.pdf,v
retrieving revision 1.3
retrieving revision 1.4
diff -u -d -r1.3 -r1.4
Binary files /tmp/cvse2sLjI and /tmp/cvsIVJG8i differ

Index: econymics.ps
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/fc03/econymics.ps,v
retrieving revision 1.2
retrieving revision 1.3
diff -u -d -r1.2 -r1.3
--- econymics.ps	16 Sep 2002 23:07:59 -0000	1.2
+++ econymics.ps	17 Sep 2002 02:37:55 -0000	1.3
@@ -2,14 +2,14 @@
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 %%based on dvipsk 5.86 Copyright 1999 Radical Eye Software (www.radicaleye.com)
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+(Danezis.) 102 b(T) -6 b(o) n(w) n(ards) 50 b(an) e(information) h
+(theoretic) g(metric) f(for) 663 4496 y(anon) n(ymit) n(y) -6
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+(2002.) 523 4672 y(22.) 43 b(Andrei) 29 b(Serjan) n(to) n(v,) h(Roger) g
+(Dingledine,) g(and) g(P) n(aul) g(Syv) n(erson.) 46
+b(F) -6 b(rom) 29 b(a) h(tric) n(kle) g(to) g(a) g(\015o) r(o) r(d:) g
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+(t) n(yp) r(es.) 33 b(In) 25 b(F) -6 b(abien) 25 b(P) n(etitcolas,) i
+(editor,) p Fa 26 w(Information) g(Hiding,) f(5th) i(Interna-) 663
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Index: econymics.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/fc03/econymics.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.35
retrieving revision 1.36
diff -u -d -r1.35 -r1.36
--- econymics.tex	17 Sep 2002 02:20:31 -0000	1.35
+++ econymics.tex	17 Sep 2002 02:37:55 -0000	1.36
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 \usepackage{amsmath}
 
 %\textwidth16cm
+\textwidth13.6cm
 %\textheight21cm
 %\topmargin0mm
 %\oddsidemargin2.5mm
@@ -298,9 +299,8 @@
 \item  Benefits of acting as a node (nodes might be rewarded for
 forwarding traffic or for creating dummy traffic), $b_{h}$.
 
-\item  Benefits of acting as a dishonest node (dishonest nodes might
-benefit from disrupting service or by using the information that passes
-through them), $b_{d}$.
+\item  Benefits of acting as a dishonest node (from disrupting service
+or by using the information that passes through them), $b_{d}$.
 \end{enumerate}
 
 The possible costs include:
@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@
 dishonest node may carry a monetary penalty).
 \end{enumerate}
 
-In addition to the above costs and benefits, there might also be \emph{%
+In addition to the above costs and benefits, there are also \emph{%
 reputation} costs and benefits from: being observed to send or receive
 anonymous messages, being perceived to act as a reliable node, and being
 thought to act as a dishonest node.
@@ -433,7 +433,7 @@
 anonymity must be protected in order to avoid losses, then $v_{r}$ will be
 positive while $v_{a}$ will be negative and $p_{a}$ will enter the payoff
 function as $\left( 1-p_{a}\right) $.\footnote{%
-In such a scenario, being certain of staying anonymous would therefore
+Being certain of staying anonymous would therefore
 eliminate the risk of $v_{a}$, while being certain of losing anonymity would
 impose on the agent the full cost $v_{a}$.} On the other side, if the agent
 must send a certain message to avoid some losses but anonymity ensures her
@@ -780,13 +780,12 @@
 The problems start if we consider now a different situation. Rather than
 having a continuous distribution of evaluations $v_{i}$, we consider two
 types of agents: the agent with a high valuation, $v_{H}$, and the agent
-with a low valuations, $v_{L}$. We can assume that the $v_{L}$ agents will simply participate
-sending traffic if the system is cheap enough for them to use,\footnote{%
-We will go back to this assumption when we will discuss the bootstraping of
-the system and the incentives of people with low sensitivity to anonymity.}
-and we can also assume that this will not pose any problem to the $v_{H}$
-type, which in fact has an interest in having more traffic. This allows us
-to focus on the interaction between a subset of users: the identical
+with a low valuations, $v_{L}$. We assume that the $v_{L}$ agents will simply participate
+sending traffic if the system is cheap enough for them to use (but see
+Section \ref{sec:bootstrapping},
+and we also assume this will not pose any problem to the $v_{H}$
+type, which in fact has an interest in having more traffic. Thus
+we can focus on the interaction between a subset of users: the identical
 high-types. 
 
 Here the marginal argument discussed above will not work, and coordination
@@ -979,6 +978,7 @@
 the best way to counter them.
 
 \subsection{Bootstrapping the system and perceived costs}
+\label{sec:bootstrapping}
 
 Our models so far have considered the strategic choices of agents facing an
 already existing mix-net. We might even imagine that the system does not yet

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