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[freehaven-cvs] fixes from alessandro

To: freehaven-cvs@freehaven.net
Subject: [freehaven-cvs] fixes from alessandro
From: arma@seul.org (Roger Dingledine)
Date: Mon, 16 Sep 2002 23:43:19 -0400 (EDT)
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Update of /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/fc03
In directory moria.seul.org:/home/arma/work/freehaven/doc/fc03

Modified Files:
	econymics.pdf econymics.ps econymics.tex 
Log Message:
fixes from alessandro

we're good to go (i hope)


Index: econymics.pdf
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/fc03/econymics.pdf,v
retrieving revision 1.4
retrieving revision 1.5
diff -u -d -r1.4 -r1.5
Binary files /tmp/cvsTpOUc1 and /tmp/cvselaufT differ

Index: econymics.ps
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/fc03/econymics.ps,v
retrieving revision 1.3
retrieving revision 1.4
diff -u -d -r1.3 -r1.4
--- econymics.ps	17 Sep 2002 02:37:55 -0000	1.3
+++ econymics.ps	17 Sep 2002 03:43:17 -0000	1.4
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 %DVIPSWebPage: (www.radicaleye.com)
 %DVIPSCommandLine: dvips -o econymics.ps econymics.dvi
 %DVIPSParameters: dpi=600, compressed
-%DVIPSSource:  TeX output 2002.09.16:2237
+%DVIPSSource:  TeX output 2002.09.16:2343
 %%BeginProcSet: texc.pro
 %!
 /TeXDict 300 dict def TeXDict begin/N{def}def/B{bind def}N/S{exch}N/X{S
@@ -395,114 +395,106 @@
 C0017C180749180F4848F01F800003197F49EF01FF4848050713004848173F48CA000FB5
 FC48BA5AA25ABB5AA24D537B7F58> 80 D E
[...1880 lines suppressed...]
+Fs 35 w(anon) n(ymit) n(y) f(b) n(y) g(bringing) g(more) g(users.) g
+(But) h(to) f(attract) g(this) h(co) n(v) n(er) e(tra\016c,) 664
+4127 y(they) h(ma) n(y) g(w) n(ell) f(ha) n(v) n(e) g(to) h(address) f
+(the) h(fact) g(that) g(most) g(users) f(do) h(not) g(w) n(an) n(t) f
+(\(or) g(do) h(not) g(realize) 664 4226 y(they) j(w) n(an) n(t\)) f
+(anon) n(ymit) n(y) g(protection.) p Fi 575 4318 a({) p
+Fs 41 w(High-sensitivit) n(y) g(agen) n(ts) f(ha) n(v) n(e) g(incen) n
 (tiv) n(e) h(to) g(run) g(no) r(des,) g(so) g(they) g(can) g(b) r(e) h
-(certain) f(their) g(\014rst) 664 4401 y(hop) i(is) g(honest.) g(There)
+(certain) f(their) g(\014rst) 664 4418 y(hop) i(is) g(honest.) g(There)
 g(can) g(b) r(e) g(an) g(optimal) g(lev) n(el) g(of) g(free-riding:) f
-(in) h(some) g(conditions) g(these) 664 4500 y(agen) n(ts) g(will) h
+(in) h(some) g(conditions) g(these) 664 4517 y(agen) n(ts) g(will) h
 (opt) h(to) f(accept) f(the) i(cost) f(of) g(o\013ering) f(service) g
 (to) h(others) f(in) h(order) f(to) h(gain) g(co) n(v) n(er) 664
-4600 y(tra\016c.) p Fi 575 4709 a({) p Fs 41 w(While) 21
+4617 y(tra\016c.) p Fi 575 4709 a({) p Fs 41 w(While) 21
 b(there) e(are) g(economic) g(reasons) f(for) h(distributed) h(trust,) g
 (the) g(deplo) n(ymen) n(t) g(of) g(a) f(completely) 664
 4809 y(decen) n(tralized) 35 b(system) h(migh) n(t) g(in) n(v) n(olv) n

Index: econymics.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/fc03/econymics.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.39
retrieving revision 1.40
diff -u -d -r1.39 -r1.40
--- econymics.tex	17 Sep 2002 03:33:28 -0000	1.39
+++ econymics.tex	17 Sep 2002 03:43:17 -0000	1.40
@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@
 
 For each complete strategy profile $s=\left(s_{1},...,s_{n}\right)$, each
 agent receives a \\von Neumann-Morgenstern utility $u_{i}(s)$.
-The payoff function $u_{i}$ is based on a variety of benefits and costs. The
+The utility comes from a variety of benefits and costs. The
 benefits include:
 
 \begin{enumerate}
@@ -334,8 +334,8 @@
 to the investments necessary to setup the software. The variable costs
 are dominated by the costs of traffic passing through the node.
 
-\item  Costs of acting as dishonest node, $c_{d}$ (being exposed as a
-dishonest node may carry a monetary penalty).
+\item  Costs of acting as dishonest node, $c_{d}$ (again carrying traffic;
+and being exposed as a dishonest node may carry a monetary penalty).
 \end{enumerate}
 
 In addition to the above costs and benefits, there are also \emph{%
@@ -430,7 +430,6 @@
 anonymous. We also always consider the direct benefits or losses rather than
 their dual opportunity costs or avoided costs. Nevertheless, the above
 representation allows us to formalize the various possible combinations.
-
 For example, if a certain message is sent to gain some benefit, but
 anonymity must be protected in order to avoid losses, then $v_{r}$ will be
 positive while $v_{a}$ will be negative and $p_{a}$ will enter the payoff
@@ -526,8 +525,8 @@
 level of anonymity in the system based on traffic and number of nodes.
 Finally, we imagine that agents use the system because they want
 to avoid potential losses from not being anonymous. This sensitivity to
-anonymity can be represented with the continuous variable $v_{i}=\left[ \text{\b{%
-v}},\bar{v}\right] $. In other words, we initially focus on the goal of
+anonymity can be represented with the continuous variable
+$v_{i}=\left[ \b{v},\bar{v}\right] $. In other words, we initially focus on the goal of
 remaning anonymous given an adversary that can control some nodes and
 observe all communications. We later comment on the addition reliability
 issues.
@@ -586,7 +585,7 @@
 actions. They simply consider the status of the network and, depending
 on the payoffs of the one-period game, adopt a certain strategy. Suppose
 that a new agent with a privacy sensitivity $v_{i}$ is considering using
-a mix-net with $\bar{n}_{s}$ users and $\bar{n}_{h}$ nodes.
+a mix-net with $\bar{n}_{s}$ users and $\bar{n}_{h}$ honest nodes.
 
 Then if
 \begin{equation*}
@@ -716,7 +715,7 @@
 player. We define the payoff of each player as
 the average of his payoffs against the distribution of strategies played by
 the continuum of the other players. In other words, for each type, we will
-have: $u_{i}=\sum_{n_{s}}u_{i}\left( s_{i},s_{-i}\right) $ where the
+have: $u_{i}=\sum_{n_{s}}u_{i}\left( a_{i},a_{-i}\right) $ where the
 notation represents the comparison between one specific agent $i$ and all the
 others. Cooperative solutions with a finite horizon are often not
 sustainable when the actions of other agents are not observable because,
@@ -732,9 +731,9 @@
 act this way, the system might break down for lack of nodes, after which
 everybody would have to resort to non-anonymous channels.
 
-We can consider this to be a ``public good with free-riding'' type
-of problem \cite{cornes-sandler-86}. 
-The highly sensitive agents actually
+We can consider this to be a ``public good with free-riding'' type of
+problem \cite{cornes-sandler-86}. The novel point from a game-theoretic
+perspective is that the highly sensitive agents actually
 \emph{want} some level of free-riding, to provide noise. On the other
 side, they do not want too much free-riding --- for example from highly
 sensitive type pretending to be agents with low sensitivity --- if it
@@ -784,14 +783,15 @@
 types of agents: the agent with a high valuation, $v_{H}$, and the agent
 with a low valuations, $v_{L}$. We assume that the $v_{L}$ agents will simply participate
 sending traffic if the system is cheap enough for them to use (but see
-Section \ref{sec:bootstrapping},
+Section \ref{sec:bootstrapping}),
 and we also assume this will not pose any problem to the $v_{H}$
 type, which in fact has an interest in having more traffic. Thus
 we can focus on the interaction between a subset of users: the identical
 high-types. 
 
-Here the marginal argument discussed above will not work, and coordination
-might be costly. In this scenario where the system is self-sustaining and free and the agents
+Here the marginal argument discussed above might not work, and coordination
+might be costly. In order to have a scenario where the system is
+self-sustaining and free and the agents
 are of high and low types, the actions of the agents must be visible and the
 agents themselves must agree to react together to any
 deviation of a marginal player. In realistic scenarios, however, this will involve very high
@@ -1015,7 +1015,7 @@
 Note that here again reliability becomes an issue,
 since we must consider both the benefits from sending a message \textit{and }%
 keeping it anonymous. If the benefits of sending the message are not that
-high in first instance, then the agents will have low sensitivity agent will
+high in first instance, then the agents with low sensitivity will
 have fewer incentives to spend anything to mantain the message itself
 anonymous. Given that in our model we consider the costs and benefits of
 using a certain system, we can of course extend the analysis to the

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