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[freehaven-cvs] a few initial edits
Update of /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/fc04
In directory moria.mit.edu:/home2/arma/work/freehaven/doc/fc04
Modified Files:
minion-systems.bib minion-systems.tex
Log Message:
a few initial edits
Index: minion-systems.bib
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/fc04/minion-systems.bib,v
retrieving revision 1.2
retrieving revision 1.3
diff -u -d -r1.2 -r1.3
--- minion-systems.bib 8 Sep 2003 22:22:03 -0000 1.2
+++ minion-systems.bib 8 Sep 2003 23:03:28 -0000 1.3
@@ -1,4 +1,25 @@
-@inproceedings{ rao-pseudonymity,
+
+@inproceedings{econymics,
+ title = {{On the Economics of Anonymity}},
+ author = {Alessandro Acquisti and Roger Dingledine and Paul Syverson},
+ booktitle = {Proceedings of Financial Cryptography (FC '03)},
+ year = {2003},
+ month = {January},
+ editor = {Jean Camp and Rebecca Wright},
+ publisher = {Springer-Verlag, LNCS (forthcoming)},
+ note = {\url{http://freehaven.net/doc/fc03/econymics.pdf}},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{mixminion,
+ title = {{Mixminion: Design of a Type III Anonymous Remailer Protocol}},
+ author = {George Danezis and Roger Dingledine and Nick Mathewson},
+ booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy},
+ year = {2003},
+ month = {May},
+ note = {\url{http://mixminion.net/minion-design.pdf}},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{rao-pseudonymity,
author = "Josyula R. Rao and Pankaj Rohatgi",
title = "Can Pseudonymity Really Guarantee Privacy?",
booktitle = "Proceedings of the Ninth USENIX Security Symposium",
@@ -22,7 +43,7 @@
@Misc{mixminion-spec,
author = {George Danezis and Roger Dingledine and Nick Mathewson},
title = {Type {III} ({M}ixminion) Mix Protocol Specifications},
- note = {\newline \url{http://mixminion.net/minion-spec.txt}},
+ note = {\url{http://mixminion.net/minion-spec.txt}},
}
@InProceedings{BM:mixencrypt,
Index: minion-systems.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/fc04/minion-systems.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.3
retrieving revision 1.4
diff -u -d -r1.3 -r1.4
--- minion-systems.tex 8 Sep 2003 22:22:03 -0000 1.3
+++ minion-systems.tex 8 Sep 2003 23:03:28 -0000 1.4
@@ -6,9 +6,9 @@
\begin{document}
-\title{foo}
+\title{Mixminion: a Strong Anonymity System to Resist Traffic Analysis}
\author{Nick Mathewson and Roger Dingledine}
-\institute{The Free Haven Project
+\institute{The Free Haven Project\\
\email{\{nickm,arma\}@freehaven.net}}
\maketitle
@@ -16,16 +16,16 @@
\begin{abstract}
Anonymous communication is a valuable but underused tool for the
-security of financial communications. Even as early as the first
+security of financial communications. As early as the first
commercial telegraph codes, businesses have recognized the value of
using cryptography to conceal the contents of their communication from
-prying eyes. But even when communications are encrypted, adversaries
-can still learn of confidential business relationships by performing
-traffic analysis to discover the {\it presence} of communication.
+prying eyes. But simply encrypting communications still allows
+adversaries to learn confidential business relationships by performing
+traffic analysis to discover the {\it presence} of such communication.
Mixminion is an open-source, deployed research system that provides
-strong resistance against known forms of traffic analysis, and allows
-users to communicate without their identities being discovered.
+strong resistance against known forms of traffic analysis, allowing
+users to communicate without revealing their identities.
\end{abstract}
@@ -34,8 +34,9 @@
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
\section{Introduction: Anonymity and Finance}
-In this paper, we argue for the value to the finance community of
-strong anonymous communications to resist traffic analysis.
+
+In this paper, we argue that strongly anonymous communications that
+resist traffic analysis are valuable to the finance community.
Soon after the first business-related telegram was sent to an
untrusted telegraph operator, businesses have recognized the
@@ -78,10 +79,10 @@
within capabilities of the NSA-supported ECHELON eavesdropping system
(which has been probably used to advance the commercial interests of
its sponsor nations) [XXXX must confirm this], or the capabilities of
-many COMINT-sophisticated nation inclined to use its resources for
+any COMINT-sophisticated nation inclined to use its resources for
economic goals.
-In this paper, we discuss several existing systems and designs to
+In this short paper, we discuss several existing systems and designs to
defeat traffic analysis. We focus on Mixminion, an open-source
application with a deployed research network.
@@ -119,12 +120,14 @@
certain kinds of traffic analysis, they cannot defend against an
adversary with significant COMINT abilities.
+
+
\section{Mixminion: Open source strong anonymity}
Mixminion is the reference implementation of the Type III mix-net,
which was first designed between 2001 and 2002 to address the (few)
weaknesses of Type II, while obviating the need for Type I by
reintroducing reply messages. Its design was first published in
-\cite{minion-design}; its specification is publicly available
+\cite{mixminion}; its specification is publicly available
\cite{mixminion-spec}.
The Type III mix-net design improves on previously deployed designs
@@ -152,8 +155,9 @@
areas ahead are, broadly:
\begin{itemize}
\item {\bf Usability and client implementation.} For an anonymity
- system to hide its users communications, it must have many users to
- hide them among. The current Mixminion client runs only from a
+ system to hide its users' communications, it must have many users to
+ hide them among. Usability is a security parameter
+ \cite{econymics,back01}. The current Mixminion client runs only from a
command line on Unix-like platforms, though a Windows32 client is
planned within the next few months. For maximum user acceptance,
more work is needed to integrate Mixminion with existing email
@@ -171,13 +175,15 @@
\item {\bf Abuse prevention.} One of the best ways to attack users'
anonymity is by mounting a denial of service attack against some or
all of the Type III mix-net, in order to force users onto
- compromised servers, or to force them to use insecure
- channels. [XXXX say more.]
+ compromised servers, or to force them to use other (less secure)
+ channels. At the same time,
\item {\bf Enterprise integration.} The current implementation,
because of its volunteer roots, assumes that most installations are
for a single computer. In an enterprise environment, however, it
- could be more reasonable to integrate a single Mixminion as a part
- of the outgoing email server.
+ could be more reasonable to integrate a single Mixminion node as a
+ part of the outgoing email server. This \emph{enclave firewall} model
+ allows the enterprise's security administrators to do their jobs while
+ still protecting the company's activities from outside observers.
\end{itemize}
[XXXX Should we talk more about the academic/research side of our
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