[freehaven-cvs] fix some typos

[arma@seul.org (Roger Dingledine)]

Update of /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/pynchon-gate
In directory moria.mit.edu:/home2/arma/work/freehaven/doc/pynchon-gate

Modified Files:
	pynchon.tex 
Log Message:
fix some typos


Index: pynchon.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/pynchon-gate/pynchon.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.18
retrieving revision 1.19
diff -u -d -r1.18 -r1.19
--- pynchon.tex	15 Sep 2004 19:57:00 -0000	1.18
+++ pynchon.tex	15 Sep 2004 22:27:24 -0000	1.19
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@
 protection~\cite{econymics}.  This implies that we should gracefully handle
 node failure without loss of mail; that we must not require more bandwidth
 than volunteer servers are able to provide or users are willing to use; and
-that we hould not require a complicated interface or special knowledge from
+that we should not require a complicated interface or special knowledge from
 our users.
 
 \subsubsection{In this paper}
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@
 subsection~\ref{subsec:client-design}.  In section~\label{sec:security} we
 analyze security, and in section~\ref{sec:performance} we discuss
 optimizations and compare our performance to that of other pseudonymous
-message systems.)  We close with an evaluation of our succcess in
+message systems.)  We close with an evaluation of our success in
 section~\ref{sec:conclusions}.
 
 \section{Background and attacks}
@@ -119,15 +119,15 @@
 \subsection{Related Work}
 \label{subsec:related-work}
 Below we discuss existing designs for pseudonymous message delivery.  Many
-assume the existance of a ``forward'' anonymous channel that a sender can use
-to send a message to a known recipient while prenting the recipient, the
+assume the existence of a ``forward'' anonymous channel that a sender can use
+to send a message to a known recipient while preventing the recipient, the
 infrastructure, and any attackers from knowing who is communicating with
 whom.  Currently deployed designs are based on Chaum's mix~\cite{chaum-mix}
 architecture, and include the  Mixmaster~\cite{mixmaster-spec} and
 Mixminion~\cite{mixminion} anonymous remailer networks.  It is trivial to use
 these systems to {\it send} pseudonymous messages: the sender can make an
 anonymous message pseudonymous by signing it with a public
-key associated with her pseudonym.  Thus, the designs below focs on the
+key associated with her pseudonym.  Thus, the designs below focus on the
 problem of {\it receiving} messages sent to a pseudonymous address.
 
 \subsubsection{Reply blocks and return addresses.}
@@ -536,7 +536,7 @@
 finishing when the next scan returns to that same point. Thus the latency
 is exactly the time of one full scan.
 
-Back et. al discuss similar performance vs. anonymity trade-off issues for
+Back et al. discuss similar performance vs. anonymity trade-off issues for
 low-latency anonymity systems, and also conclude that deployability over
 existing network infrastructure with attainable resources must be a design
 consideration for serious anonymity solutions~\cite{back01}.

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