[Author Prev][Author Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Author Index][Thread Index]
[freehaven-cvs] Add citations for related work, security section fix...
Update of /home2/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/pynchon-gate
In directory moria.mit.edu:/tmp/cvs-serv22149
Modified Files:
pynchon.tex pynchon.bib
Log Message:
Add citations for related work, security section fixes.
Index: pynchon.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home2/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/pynchon-gate/pynchon.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.50
retrieving revision 1.51
diff -u -d -r1.50 -r1.51
--- pynchon.tex 18 Sep 2004 02:08:11 -0000 1.50
+++ pynchon.tex 18 Sep 2004 02:19:23 -0000 1.51
@@ -99,9 +99,10 @@
analysis, or require unacceptably large amounts of bandwidth and storage
as the number of users and volume of traffic increase.
-We propose the Pynchon Gate, a design that uses
-private information retrieval (PIR)~\cite{pir} primitives to build a secure,
-fault-tolerant pseudonymous mail retrieval system.
+We propose the Pynchon Gate, a design that uses private information
+retrieval (PIR)~\cite{pir} primitives to build a secure, fault-tolerant
+pseudonymous mail retrieval system.
+
In our system, pseudonymous users (or ``nym holders'') use an existing
anonymous email network (such as Mixmaster~\cite{mixmaster-spec} or
Mixminion~\cite{mixminion}) to send authenticated requests to a {\it nym
@@ -153,17 +154,22 @@
\subsection{Related Work}
\label{subsec:related-work}
-Below we discuss existing designs for pseudonymous message delivery. Many
-assume the existence of a ``forward'' anonymous channel that a sender can use
-to send a message to a known recipient while preventing the recipient, the
-infrastructure, and any attackers from knowing who is communicating with
-whom. Currently deployed designs are based on Chaum's mix~\cite{chaum-mix}
-architecture, and include the Mixmaster~\cite{mixmaster-spec} and
-Mixminion~\cite{mixminion} anonymous remailer networks. It is trivial to use
-these systems to {\it send} pseudonymous messages: the sender can make an
-anonymous message pseudonymous by signing it with a public
-key associated with her pseudonym. Thus, these designs focus on how to
-{\it receive} messages sent to a pseudonymous address.
+Below we discuss existing designs for pseudonymous message delivery.
+Many assume the existence of a ``forward'' anonymous channel that a sender
+can use to send a message to a known recipient while preventing the
+recipient, the infrastructure, and any attackers from knowing who is
+communicating with whom. Currently deployed designs are based on Chaum's
+mix~\cite{chaum-mix} architecture, and include the
+Mixmaster~\cite{mixmaster-spec} and Mixminion~\cite{mixminion} anonymous
+remailer networks.\footnote{Other descriptions of the use of PIR in
+preserving recipient anonymity have been independently proposed but not
+deployed~\cite{berthold,cooper}. Independent work by Jim McCoy describes a
+similar architecture to The Pynchon Gate, but does not use an
+information-theoretic primative for preserving privacy~\cite{mccoy}.} It
+is trivial to use these systems to {\it send} pseudonymous messages: the
+sender can make an anonymous message pseudonymous by signing it with a
+public key associated with her pseudonym. Thus, these designs focus on how
+to {\it receive} messages sent to a pseudonymous address.
\subsubsection{Reply blocks and return addresses.}
In 1981, Chaum~\cite{chaum-mix} described a method of using \emph{return
@@ -511,13 +517,13 @@
%which has been proposed as the basis for the Mixminion nym
%servers~\cite{imap-over-minion}.}
-\subsection{Known attacks against pseudonymity systems}
-\label{subsec:known-attacks}
+\section{Known attacks against pseudonymity systems}
+\label{sec:security}
We discuss the security implications in pseudonymity systems throughout
this paper. Most attacks on pseudonymity systems fall into one of the
following categories.
-\subsubsection{Legal and hacking attacks.}
+\subsection{Legal and hacking attacks.}
Attackers may attempt to coerce the operators of pseudonymity systems
through lawsuits or other means, or may attempt to surreptitiously obtain
information about nym holders. Systems should be designed so that such
@@ -555,7 +561,7 @@
and discard $\SUBKEY(j,i)$. After each cycle, the nymserver should discard
the last $\SUBKEY(j,i)$, and $\UserID{}[i]$.
-\subsubsection{Mix attacks.}
+\subsection{Mix attacks.}
Systems based on the mix-net primative must be concerned with attacks
against the underlying mix-network, as they rely upon it for security.
Additionally, reply-block-based nym server systems require additional
@@ -565,7 +571,7 @@
which do not work against a mix-net in normal forward-delivery mode will
not impact Pynchon Gate.
-\subsection{Man-in-the-middle attacks.}
+\section{Man-in-the-middle attacks.}
An attacker able to pose as a component in the system may be able to learn
information about the users of the system. Authentication of the
components should be performed to prevent such attacks.
@@ -579,7 +585,7 @@
used to authenticate the distributor and establish the TLS session for the
PIR protocol, and should be rotated regularly to provide forward secrecy.
-\subsubsection{Replay attacks.}
+\subsection{Replay attacks.}
An attacker capable of monitoring the communications network may attempt
to obtain information about nym holders by comparing network and user
behavior when a given message or packet is transmitted multiple times.
@@ -589,7 +595,7 @@
topology of the Pynchon Gate infrastructure further eliminates areas of
potential replay attack risk.
-\subsubsection{Tagging and known-cleartext attacks.} An attacker may alter
+\subsection{Tagging and known-cleartext attacks.} An attacker may alter
a message, or observe the cleartext of a message, so that he may be able
to later link an input message with a given output retrieved by the
nym holder.
@@ -618,7 +624,7 @@
% Also: social engineering; traffic analysis; leave/join attacks...
-\subsubsection{Usage pattern and intersection attacks.}
+\subsection{Usage pattern and intersection attacks.}
An attacker may analyze network usage and anonymity set members over time
to sub-divide anonymity sets such that a given user is identified. In
Index: pynchon.bib
===================================================================
RCS file: /home2/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/pynchon-gate/pynchon.bib,v
retrieving revision 1.18
retrieving revision 1.19
diff -u -d -r1.18 -r1.19
--- pynchon.bib 17 Sep 2004 22:11:31 -0000 1.18
+++ pynchon.bib 18 Sep 2004 02:19:23 -0000 1.19
@@ -215,6 +215,25 @@
www_pdf_url = {http://www.onion-router.net/Publications/IH-1996.pdf},
}
+@inproceedings{berthold,
+ author = {Oliver Berthold and Sebastian Clau\ss and Stefan K\"opsell and Andreas Pfitzmann},
+ title = {Efficiency Improvements of the Private Message Service},
+ booktitle = {Proceedings of Information Hiding Workshop (IH 2001)},
+ year = {2001},
+ month = {April},
+ editor = {Ira S. Moskowitz},
+ publisher = {Springer-Verlag, LNCS 2137},
+ pages = {112-125},
+}
+
+@inproceedings{cooper,
+ title = {Preserving Privacy in a Network of Mobile Computers},
+ author = {David A. Cooper and Kenneth P. Birman},
+ booktitle = {Proceedings of the 1995 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy},
+ year = {1995},
+ month = {May},
+}
+
@inproceedings{back01,
title = {Traffic Analysis Attacks and Trade-Offs in Anonymity Providing Systems},
author = {Adam Back and Ulf M\"oller and Anton Stiglic},
@@ -506,6 +525,16 @@
www_txt_url = {http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2246.txt},
}
+@misc{rfc-2440,
+ title = {{OpenPGP Message Format}},
+ author = {J. Callas and L. Donnerhacke and H. Finney and R. Thayer},
+ year = {1998},
+ month = {November},
+ organization = {Internet Engineering Task Force},
+ howpublished = {Request for Comments: 2440},
+ www_txt_url = {http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2440.txt},
+}
+
@misc{rfc-2779,
title = {{Instant Messaging / Presence Protocol Requirements}},
author = {M. Day and S. Aggarwal and G. Mohr and J. Vincent},
@@ -538,6 +567,17 @@
howpublished = {\url{http://www.penet.fi/press-english.html}},
}
+@misc{mccoy,
+ author = {Jim McCoy},
+ title = {Anonymous Mailbox Servers},
+ year = {1997},
+ month = {August},
+ howpublished = {Presentation, HIP'97},
+}
+
+
+
+
@inproceedings{econymics,
title = {On the Economics of Anonymity},
author = {Alessandro Acquisti and Roger Dingledine and Paul Syverson},
@@ -557,4 +597,3 @@
www_section = traffic,
www_pdf_url = "http://freehaven.net/doc/e2e-traffic/e2e-traffic.pdf";,
}
-
***********************************************************************
To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majordomo@seul.org with
unsubscribe freehaven-cvs in the body. http://freehaven.net/