[freehaven-cvs] ispell

[arma@xxxxxxxx]

Update of /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/pynchon-gate
In directory moria:/home/arma/work/freehaven/doc/pynchon-gate

Modified Files:
	pynchon.tex 
Log Message:
ispell


Index: pynchon.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/pynchon-gate/pynchon.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.75
retrieving revision 1.76
diff -u -d -r1.75 -r1.76
--- pynchon.tex	2 Sep 2005 07:22:20 -0000	1.75
+++ pynchon.tex	2 Sep 2005 07:48:52 -0000	1.76
@@ -680,7 +680,7 @@
 Users of the Pynchon Gate select distributors from which to receive data
 at random, each time the nym holder retrieves her messages. Unlike
 systems where the pseudonym infrastructure initiates the delivery of
-messages, the Pynchon Gate Client initiates the retrival of messages, and
+messages, the Pynchon Gate Client initiates the retrieval of messages, and
 thus message retrieval cannot be correlated to a given nym by a malicious
 sender.
 
@@ -705,7 +705,7 @@
 may leak information about the nym holder,
 traffic from the client to the distributors is regulated by the
 client, which queries the distributors only at given intervals. To thwart active
-attacks against the distributor targetting a specific client, clients should
+attacks against the distributor targeting a specific client, clients should
 choose these intervals randomly.
 %XXXX Fix this in design.
 
@@ -733,7 +733,7 @@
     $r N$ \\Type III nymserver
 \footnote{\tiny Underhill can be used in a full padding mode. In this case, the
 performance evaluation is the same, except that $CVol_i$ is calculated as
-the maximum compressed volume a user can recieve, rather than the
+the maximum compressed volume a user can receive, rather than the
 average.} &
     $\sum \Vol_i + (M+r) \sum \left\lceil \frac{\CVol_i}{P} \right\rceil $&
     $\frac{2 L (M+r)}{S} \sum \left\lceil \frac{\CVol_i}{P} \right\rceil $&
@@ -807,7 +807,7 @@
 $\ell$, against a nym server with $N=2^{16}$ active pseudo\-nymous users.
 (This is probably an overestimate of the number of users on typical nymserver
 today~\cite{nym-alias-net}.)   We performed 100 trials for each set of
-paramaters.  In the worst case (for the nym holder), when
+parameters.  In the worst case (for the nym holder), when
 $P_M=0.5, \ell=1, P_D=0.1$, the lack of
 mix-net delay variance allowed the simulated
 attacker to guess the user's identity correctly after the user received an
@@ -946,7 +946,7 @@
 PIR stream seed size is $SS$, and $K$ is the number of distributors chosen
 from which to retrieve data.
 
-%\subsection{Performance of the Pynchon Gate under realisic user load}
+%\subsection{Performance of the Pynchon Gate under realistic user load}
 If we assume one cycle per day with 10,000 users per collator who receive
 100,000 KB of data each cycle, each collator will transfer 2
 GB per day. This allows a bucket size of 10 KB, with distributor query sizes

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