[freehaven-dev] Talk on Anonymity and Reputations, tomorrow 2pm NE43-516

[Roger Dingledine <arma@mit.edu>]

Feel free to drop by tomorrow if you're in the Boston area --- it should
be a fun talk. It will basically be the talk I gave at the O'Reilly
conference last week, but with a few more assumptions about what my
audience knows.

--Roger

----- Forwarded message from Michael J Freedman <mfreed@MIT.EDU> -----

From: Michael J Freedman <mfreed@MIT.EDU>
Date: Tue, 13 Nov 2001 17:54:50 -0500
To: asrg@amsterdam.lcs.MIT.EDU
Cc: arma@MIT.EDU
Subject: Meeting tomorrow (Wed), 2-3pm

Hi folks,

Sorry for the late notice, but ASRG will indeed be returning tomorrow
from its two-week hiatus.  That's Wednesday, Nov 14, 2:00-3:00pm,
NE43-516. 

Roger Dingledine will be presenting a talk entitled:

  "Anonymous Communications and Reputation"

This talk builds upon two papers focusing on using reputation systems to
increase reliability in mix-net systems.  It especially emphasizes the
latter paper on mix-cascades.

-------
Papers:   http://freehaven.net/papers.html
          http://freehaven.net/doc/mix-acc/mix-acc.ps
          http://freehaven.net/doc/casc-rep/casc-rep.ps

  "A Reputation System to Increase MIX-net Reliability."
  Joint work with Mike Freedman, David Hopwood, David Molnar.

  We describe a design for a reputation system that increases the
reliability and thus efficiency of remailer services. Our reputation
system uses a MIX-net in which MIXes give receipts for intermediate
messages. Together with a set of witnesses, these receipts allow
senders to verify the correctness of each MIX and prove misbehavior to
the witnesses.

  "Reliable MIX Cascade Networks through Reputation."
  Joint work with Paul Syverson

  We describe a MIX cascade protocol and a reputation system that
together increase the reliability of a network of MIX cascades. In our
protocol, MIX nodes periodically generate a communally random seed that,
along with their reputations, determines cascade configuration. Nodes
send test messages to monitor their cascades. Senders can also
demonstrate message decryptions to convince honest cascade members that
a cascade is misbehaving.  By allowing any node to declare the failure
of its own cascade, we eliminate the need for global trusted witnesses.

----- End forwarded message -----