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[minion-cvs] Correct some spelling; clarify whitening.



Update of /home/minion/cvsroot/doc/spec
In directory moria.mit.edu:/tmp/cvs-serv16396

Modified Files:
	E2E-spec.txt 
Log Message:
Correct some spelling; clarify whitening.

Index: E2E-spec.txt
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/minion/cvsroot/doc/spec/E2E-spec.txt,v
retrieving revision 1.7
retrieving revision 1.8
diff -u -d -r1.7 -r1.8
--- E2E-spec.txt	9 Aug 2003 02:51:53 -0000	1.7
+++ E2E-spec.txt	9 Aug 2003 02:56:55 -0000	1.8
@@ -242,13 +242,12 @@
 
    While some fragments of a message are stored, but before the entire
    message has been received, a window of vulnerability exists on the
-   exit server.  To prevent any portion of a message from being read in
-   the clear before enough packets from the message have arrived,
-   the following whitening formula to messages before
-   fragmentation:
+   exit server.  To prevent any portion of a message from being read
+   in the clear before enough packets from the message have arrived,
+   apply the following whitening formula to messages before fragmentation:
 
    WHITEN(M) = SPRP_Encrypt(K_whiten, "WHITEN", M)
-   UNWHITEN(M) = DPRP_Decrypt(K_whiten, "WHITEN", M)
+   UNWHITEN(M) = SPRP_Decrypt(K_whiten, "WHITEN", M)
 
    where K_whiten is equal to the octet sequence {57 48 49 54 45 4E}.
 
@@ -441,7 +440,7 @@
            Let P = K | PAYLOAD_i
            Let P0 = PK_Encrypt(PK, P[0:PKLEN-OAEP_OVERHEAD])
       Until the most significant bit of P0[0] is equal to 1.
-      Let P1 = SRPR_Encrypt(K, "END-TO-END ENCRYPT",
+      Let P1 = SPRP_Encrypt(K, "END-TO-END ENCRYPT",
                             P[PKLEN-OAEP_OVERHEAD: Len(P)-PKLEN-OAEP_OVERHEAD])
       Let TAG_i = P0[0:TAG_LEN]
       Let EPAYLOAD_i = P0[TAG_LEN:Len(P0)-TAG_LEN] | P1