[minion-cvs] Fixes based on comments by Erik Arneson

[nickm@seul.org (Nick Mathewson)]

Update of /home/minion/cvsroot/doc/spec
In directory moria.mit.edu:/tmp/cvs-serv29202/spec

Modified Files:
	nym-spec.txt minion-spec.txt 
Log Message:
Fixes based on comments by Erik Arneson

Index: nym-spec.txt
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/minion/cvsroot/doc/spec/nym-spec.txt,v
retrieving revision 1.5
retrieving revision 1.6
diff -u -d -r1.5 -r1.6
--- nym-spec.txt	7 Oct 2003 19:56:10 -0000	1.5
+++ nym-spec.txt	20 Feb 2004 21:58:50 -0000	1.6
@@ -497,11 +497,11 @@
 4.2. Message Encryption
 
    After synopsizing an email, the nymserver encrypts it immediately
-   with the nymholder's private key.
+   with the nymholder's public key.
 
    If a nymserver holds a set of synopses for longer than the
    nymholder-specified length of time, it encrypts those synopses with
-   the nymholder's private key.
+   the nymholder's public key.
 
    To encrypt an octet sequence, the nymserver first compresses the
    octet sequence (as described in E2E-spec.txt).  Next, the nymserver
@@ -521,7 +521,7 @@
      Let PADDING_LEN = CEIL(LEN(M_C)/P) - LEN(M_C).
      Let M_P = M | Z(PADDING_LEN).
 
-     Let K = R(16).
+     Let K = Rand(16).
      Let M_Enc = SPRP_Encrypt(K, "", M_P)
      Let RSA_LEN = Len(PK_nym) - PK_OVERHEAD_LEN - 16
      Let RSA_PART = PK_Encrypt(PK_nym, K | M_Enc[0:RSA_LEN])

Index: minion-spec.txt
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/minion/cvsroot/doc/spec/minion-spec.txt,v
retrieving revision 1.25
retrieving revision 1.26
diff -u -d -r1.25 -r1.26
--- minion-spec.txt	17 Dec 2003 00:44:07 -0000	1.25
+++ minion-spec.txt	20 Feb 2004 21:58:50 -0000	1.26
@@ -278,30 +278,30 @@
 
    Thus, in the notation described below, we encrypt a message M with
    a key K as follows:
-           K1 = K
-           K2 = K ^ [00 ... 01]
-           K2 = K ^ [00 ... 02]
-           K4 = K ^ [00 ... 03]
-           L := M[0:20]
-           R := M[20:Len(M)-20]
-           R := Encrypt( Hash(K1 | L | K1)[0:16], R )
-           L := L ^ Hash(K2 | R | K2)
-           R := Encrypt( Hash(K3 | L | K3)[0:16], R )
-           L := L ^ Hash(K4 | R | K4)
-           SPRP_Encrypt(K, M) = L | R
+       K1 = K
+       K2 = K ^ [00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01]
+       K3 = K ^ [00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02]
+       K4 = K ^ [00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03]
+       L := M[0:20]
+       R := M[20:Len(M)-20]
+       R := Encrypt( Hash(K1 | L | K1)[0:16], R )
+       L := L ^ Hash(K2 | R | K2)
+       R := Encrypt( Hash(K3 | L | K3)[0:16], R )
+       L := L ^ Hash(K4 | R | K4)
+       SPRP_Encrypt(K, M) = L | R
 
    We decrypt a message M with a key K as follows:
-           K1 = K
-           K2 = K ^ [00 ... 01]
-           K2 = K ^ [00 ... 02]
-           K4 = K ^ [00 ... 03]
-           L := M[0:20]
-           R := M[20:Len(M)-20]
-           L := L ^ Hash(K4 | R | K4)
-           R := Encrypt( Hash(K3 | L | K3)[0:16], R )
-           L := L ^ Hash(K2 | R | K2)
-           R := Encrypt( Hash(K1 | L | K1)[0:16], R )
-           SPRP_Decrypt(K, M) = L | R
+       K1 = K
+       K2 = K ^ [00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01]
+       K3 = K ^ [00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02]
+       K4 = K ^ [00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03]
+       L := M[0:20]
+       R := M[20:Len(M)-20]
+       L := L ^ Hash(K4 | R | K4)
+       R := Encrypt( Hash(K3 | L | K3)[0:16], R )
+       L := L ^ Hash(K2 | R | K2)
+       R := Encrypt( Hash(K1 | L | K1)[0:16], R )
+       SPRP_Decrypt(K, M) = L | R
 
    K must be 20 octets long; M must be at least 20 octets long.