Open Questions with Mixminion design -> trusting remailer keys, how?

["Thomas J. Boschloo" <t.j.boschloo@hccnet.nl>]

Sorry if I haven't introduced myself, but I am working on a replacement 
system for Mixmaster (Lance Cotrell) and Nym (Frans Kaashoek) myself.

In short, I use these primitives to archive my goals:
o Single use remailer keys
o Loads of hashcash for everything that might DoS the remailer
o Outside in a remailer message everything will be in crypto with garbage 
appended, only the secret key can detect where a message ends by looking at 
the inside of a message
o I dropped fixed message size in favor of messages filled with garbage 
till 4096 octed boundries. This drops remailer loads due to fragmentation 
and reassembly and allows large messages (binaries) at a price --> 
potentionally being spotted (cutting up binaries will solve this though)
o I will try to concatenate messages together if they go to the same 
address. The receiving remailer should be able to demangle them by 
decrypting at every 4096 octed boundry
o I will allow remailer users to drop of their own public keys at every 
remailer they want to and I will use the RFC 822 data in these messages to 
route the messages back. This is the central thesis of *my* protocol (not 
mixminion, I believe this has never been done or been published about 
before)
o Something new I came up with today is on the cleanup process. I figure it 
would be best to send a special message to any address associated with a 
public key that need to be cleaned up. Due to the way I designed this 
(draft) protocol remailers will always be at full load, limited somewhat by 
the use of hashcash for clients

For the rest, it is pretty much Mixmaster 2.04 without the cypherpunk (but 
with the garbage, cutmarks and replyblock functionality added in a better 
way than PGP provides).

So that is who I am. Just a drop out from computer science in Amsterdam 
somewhere.. (I am still trying to prove myself to the world, so forgive my 
arogance and relentless violence at times, it's 'psychological', working on 
that).

HERE is my question to the group;
o PGP has WoT
o S/MIME has TTP

I think these things are very basic ingredients to any type of public key 
communications, so what does Mixminion do to solve a Key Tagging Attack as 
I will call it here?

TIA,
Thomas (I will read this majordomo list for the next couple of weeks and I 
expect people to be honest with me, not nescisarity nice or anything, the 
less time I spend on something useless, the better for me!)

Refs: <http://mixminion.net>, <http://www.cypherspace.org>, 
<http://mixmaster.sourceforge.org>, <http://nym.alias.net>

P.S. I would probably sign this message, but I am not too confident with 
the mail clienting I have been using for about a week now and I don't want 
to look stupid for having a bad signature on my first message to this group 
(I also miss my Netscape 4.8 spell checker :-((( )