Re: Lurkers: First draft: call for comments (was Re: Paperdeadlines)

[Nick Mathewson <nickm@alum.mit.edu>]

On Mon, 2002-05-06 at 22:17, Len Sassaman wrote:

Hi, Len!  I'm incorporarting most of your above suggestions.
  [...]
> Also, having the receiving remailer sign the EDH key is somewhat
> unnecessary, since it can't decrypt the payload anyway if it isn't the
> real server. (Though there could be some DOS attack prevention here.)

Re-read the part about what TLS gets us; it's not there to prevent third
parties from decrypting messages.  It's there for forward security
against eavesdroppers who later compromise or subpoena nodes, IIUC.

I'll try to clarify this a bit in the document.


> [...]
> 
> Should we add mention of remixing to 4.2? What about explicit mention of
> link-level requirements (i.e., demands signing, etc.)?

Roger and David are going to kick the batching rules around a bit; Roger
mentioned putting something more tentative later in the paper.

> Hmm.
> 
> Keeping hashes of all the headers received since the last key rotation
> will cause the same problems as keeping an incredibly long id.log -- the
> search time for the will damage performance of the system. We're looking
> at moving id.log to a db hash presently. Should potential performance
> problems be noted?

I don't think so; the techniques for efficiently storing a large number
of fixed-width values are sufficiently well known. (BTW, are you saying
that the current systems do a linear search?)

-- 
Nick