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Re: [tor-bugs] #2876 [Tor bundles/installation]: Enable arbitrary delays on keypress event delivery in TorBrowser
#2876: Enable arbitrary delays on keypress event delivery in TorBrowser
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Reporter: mikeperry | Owner: mikeperry
Type: enhancement | Status: new
Priority: normal | Milestone:
Component: Tor bundles/installation | Version:
Keywords: | Parent: #2871
Points: | Actualpoints:
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Comment(by mikeperry):
Replying to [comment:1 nickm]:
> Round-to-the-nearest-N-msec would probably obfuscate better than add-a
-random-delay. (IOW, like a timed mix, but without reordering.)
Yeah, probably. Then the fingerprinting code would always see only bins of
dwell time and bins of flight time. Certainly easier to reason about how
effective it is than some crazy probability distribution, at least.
Ideally, we'd make the bin width such that they end up with uniform
person-density in them, which means we'd need stats on the avg dwell and
avg pairwise flight time.
> I wonder if we can get source code out of academics doing this attack,
and see how well our approaches normalize cadence. It'd probably be an
easy publication, if anybody's interested.
Possibly. In my experience, getting source code out of academics is like
pulling teeth. It is one of the reasons I left academia. No one wants you
to actually try to reproduce their results... But if we could manage to
find someone willing to give us an implementation to test against, I am
all for it.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2876#comment:3>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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