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Re: [tor-bugs] #11469 [Tor]: Exit not using one hop circuit to Directory Server
#11469: Exit not using one hop circuit to Directory Server
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Reporter: bburley | Owner:
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: major | Milestone:
Component: Tor | Version:
Resolution: | Keywords: one-hop directory
Actual Points: | Parent ID:
Points: |
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Comment (by bburley):
I've spent time trying to isolate this further. It appears that when there
is an exit policy that "accepts" anything, even the default accept policy,
I see a "use_begindir 0" in the log file. shown at the end of the line
here:
`Apr 30 13:43:28.000 [debug] void directory_initiate_command_rend(const
char *, const tor_addr_t *, uint16_t, uint16_t, const char *, uint8_t,
uint8_t, dir_indirection_t, const char *, const char *, size_t, time_t,
const rend_data_t *)(): anonymized 0, use_begindir 0.`
When I have an exit policy that "rejects" everything, I see a "use
begindir 1" in the log file. shown at the end of the line here:
`Apr 30 13:43:42.000 [debug] void directory_initiate_command_rend(const
char *, const tor_addr_t *, uint16_t, uint16_t, const char *, uint8_t,
uint8_t, dir_indirection_t, const char *, const char *, size_t, time_t,
const rend_data_t *)(): anonymized 0, use_begindir 1.`
When I see "use_begindir 0" the node connects to the directory
unencrypted.
When I see "use_begindir 1" the node connects to the directory encrypted
using the one-hop circuit.
This seems similar to the behavior discussed in Trac Ticket
[ticket:10849]. I applied the patch referred to in ticket 10849 but that
did resolve this issue.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/11469#comment:2>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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