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[tor-bugs] #18702 [Tor Browser]: Downloaded files integrity
#18702: Downloaded files integrity
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Reporter: cypherpunks | Owner: tbb-team
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: Medium | Milestone:
Component: Tor Browser | Version:
Severity: Normal | Keywords:
Actual Points: | Parent ID:
Points: | Reviewer:
Sponsor: |
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Malicious exit nodes can modify downloaded files in the way they will
cause malicious activity. For example, they can add malware to executables
or embed exploit into PDFs. Most of binaries in the Web are non-signed and
downloaded via http. Even if they were signed, there is no way for a Tor
user to know that they were signed prior malicious modification removing
any trace of a signature.
So we need a bot downloading different binaries via different exit nodes
and non-torified connections, comparing the results and blacklisting
malicious exit nodes.
Naive implementation is vulnerable to the attack: a malicious website can
give a randomized binary to victim exit nodes causing them to be
blacklisted. Malicious CDNs or NSA hardware in main ISPs can be much more
dangerous and stealthy.
Maybe we should ship a db of hashes of popular binaries (programs, pdfs,
etc) and check their integrity?
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/18702>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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