Re: [tor-bugs] #23270 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow Tor relays to be configured to block selected hidden services, including racist hate sites

["Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki" <blackhole@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

#23270: Allow Tor relays to be configured to block selected hidden services,
including racist hate sites
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
 Reporter:  cypherpunks                          |          Owner:  (none)
     Type:  enhancement                          |         Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium                               |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                                 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                         |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  racism, hate, anti-fascism,          |  Actual Points:
  probably-bad-idea, slippery-slope, but-its-    |
  the-good-kind-of-censorship,                   |
Parent ID:                                       |         Points:
 Reviewer:                                       |        Sponsor:
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:13 nickm]:
 > We can't build anticensorship tools with censorship features, since
 doing so puts everyone at risk.  I'll try to explain why.
 >
 > (Before I go into it, though, let's reflect on how desperate these
 racist scumbags are, to be using a service written and operated by folks
 like you and me.  What losers!  If they really believed they were the
 "superior race", they'd try to write their own cryptography like the real
 nazis did, rather than relying on a mixed group of "degenerates" like us.)
 >
 > You describe a solution where hidden service directories can block
 whatever their operators believe should be blocked.  I think this would
 not have the results you want, for quite a few reasons.  I'll try to put a
 few of them down in one place, so I can link to it when I want to in the
 future.
 >
 >   1. It doesn't do what you want.  Even if you had a list of hidden
 service descriptors you wouldn't serve, you'd still get used as an
 introduction point or a rendezvous point.

 My understanding of the [https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree
 /rend-spec.txt rendezvous specification] is that introduction points are
 also given the public key of the OP which is trying to advertise through
 them. Couldn't ORs match against these, as well as HSDirs?

 >   2. It doesn't block the service until *every* HSDir corresponding to
 the service on the hash ring blocks it.  The loser scumbags' website would
 be up more than 50% of the time, even if you got 90% of the relay
 operators to  all block it.  (And there's no way you can get 90% of relay
 operators to agree to anything.)

 While it would be great if sites that spew hate couldn't exist at all on
 Tor, I realize that blocking a site entirely is not feasible. What does
 seem feasible to me, however, is giving relay operators the power to
 decide for themselves if they want to be a part of spreading their hateful
 message. It's only when we all work together that we can fight fascism.
 Increasing their downtime, even by just a little, would be a huge help.

 >   3. It only works until the stupid racist bastards change their .onion
 address.  The censoring relays would need to find mirrors and
 automatically add the mirrors to their blacklists. This requires an
 increasingly elaborate and centralized mechanism, which is not what you
 say you want.

 Again, blocking entirely I know is not feasible, but it does make things
 difficult for them. Perhaps relay operators could subscribe to a service
 which provides a list of known hate-speech websites, which are then
 automatically blocked on their relay (as a HSDir and as an introduction
 point). Either way, it generates work to be done on their end. Every
 little bit helps.

 >   4. It has potential, in some jurisdictions, to open relay operators to
 legal liability for things that they choose _not_ to censor. (IANAL,
 TINLA)

 I don't think this is a serious concern, any more than the concern that
 they might be found liable even without such a change being made to Tor.
 In any event, I think that the goal, which is to fight fascism, is more
 important - it is a clear and present danger ''right now'', and without
 it, Tor cannot exist. Fascists will obviously not allow Tor to operate if
 they gain power.

 >   5. The directory authorities would need to decide how much a relay can
 censor before it is not suitable for use as an hsdir.  This undoes the
 supposed democracy of the situation, _and_ puts the directory authorities
 into the role of censor-censors. Again, centralization.

 I don't see anyone blocking more than the small minority of hate speech
 websites on Tor.

 >   6. When censorship is possible and routine, censorship is far more
 easily compelled.

 See above.

 Some censorship is always necessary - such as to prevent the spread of
 ideas (like fascism) that threaten the very existence of institutions that
 are decided to free speech (like Tor). Do you think these fascists are
 going to let people run Tor if they got in power?

 >
 > Of course, maybe you could try to design a censorship tool that didn't
 have these problems!  But I think you'd find it pretty challenging.  It's
 hard enough to build an anticensorship network.
 >
 > I'm also going to edit your post to take out the link, and to reflect
 the feature you are requesting.  If you believe what you say you believe,
 you should not link to nazi sites. They like it when you do that.

 It's very frustrating to me that you're not seriously considering this, as
 evidenced by the fact that you added the obviously-sarcastic "but-its-the-
 good-kind-of-censorship" tag. Recently Tor project published a
 [https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-project-defends-human-rights-
 racists-oppose blog post] which took a stand against hate speech. It's
 easy to see why - the rise of fascism in America and Europe is real and
 measurable, and has been terrifyingly visible recently. What, then, is Tor
 Project, the new home of these violent cretins, actually going to ''do''
 about it? It's easy to nay-say and turn your nose up at things, but then,
 what real alternative is there? I can't understate the seriousness of this
 - all of us who value freedom and democracy need to take action against
 these fascists ''now'', because once they take power, we certainly won't
 be able to use Tor to organize against them (see: China, for example,
 where Tor usage is only possible through the altruism of Tor bridge
 operators from other countries).

 >
 > (Also, my apologies if I have let any brusque tone come through, but:
 there have been a lot of people trolling us over the past few days,
 pretending to be things that they are not, many of them using jargon
 that's atypical for their professed positions.  I've run into arguments
 like this a lot over and over in different places, and often, after having
 responded in good faith, I found out that I've been trolled. This kinda
 makes me short-tempered with this stuff.  If you want a good-faith
 discussion, maybe get in touch by some other means (so that trolls can't
 impersonate you), and stop accusing us of bad faith in all your messages.
 When you do that, it makes it hard for the folks you're accusing to keep a
 level head.)

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/23270#comment:18>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online

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