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[tor-bugs] #10498 [Tor bundles/installation]: Noscript. Path of trust.
#10498: Noscript. Path of trust.
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Reporter: cypherpunks | Owner: erinn
Type: task | Status: new
Priority: normal | Milestone:
Component: Tor bundles/installation | Version:
Keywords: | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
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Noscript is Firefox extension, known for years security tool and simplest
way to stop stuff. Author of Noscript never used
[http://forums.informaction.com/viewtopic.php?p=10981#p10981 public
repository] for demonstrating development progress, all known code was
available as standalone archive or file from [https://addons.mozilla.org/
AMO]. However, author used to sign components of archive
[http://hackademix.net/2013/07/20/noscript-and-flashgot-unsigned/ before
2.6.6.9 version]. All we have now to try guess files wasn't modified on a
way, and still chance to recreate history of development by hands or by
3rd party [https://github.com/avian2/noscript repository for versions
difference]
TBB takes Noscript from servers of AMO during building and run-time addon
updates. Do we trust them so much?
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10498>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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