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Re: [tor-bugs] #20907 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Blocking of public relays in Belarus, 2016-12-01
#20907: Blocking of public relays in Belarus, 2016-12-01
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Reporter: dcf | Owner: metrics-team
Type: project | Status: new
Priority: Medium | Milestone:
Component: Metrics/Censorship analysis | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: censorship block by | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
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Comment (by dcf):
OONI has a blog post with some technical details:
https://ooni.torproject.org/post/belarus-fries-onion/
> 1. Tor directory authorities are not blocked
> 2. Public onion routers have their ORPort blocked by TCP RST injection
> 3. The onion routers’ DirPort is not blocked
> 4. Plain-old non-obfuscated Tor Bridges from BridgeDB circumvent the
interference
> 5. Beltelecom (or its upstream) has strange configuration of the
networking gear injecting reset packets
The blocking of public relays is being done by RST injection. Strangely,
there are two injected RSTs, but the first one has zero for its SEQ and
ACK numbers, which would cause it to be ignored.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/20907#comment:3>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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