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Re: [tor-bugs] #20831 [Core Tor/Tor]: Support existing guard torrc options better with new guard code, or deprecate them.
#20831: Support existing guard torrc options better with new guard code, or
deprecate them.
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
Reporter: nickm | Owner: nickm
Type: defect | Status:
| needs_review
Priority: High | Milestone: Tor:
| 0.3.0.x-final
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: tor-guard regression | Actual Points: .2
TorCoreTeam201612 |
Parent ID: #20822 | Points: 2
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
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Comment (by nickm):
>I'm not 100% persuaded that NumDirectoryGuards==3 actually offers much
security, if the top primary guard is malicious. I remember the argument
about malicious directory guards refusing to serve relay descriptors, but
I kinda feel that we are screwed anyway if the top primary guard is evil
since all circuits are going to go through it anyhow.
Right. My rationale here was more strongly influenced by one of the
comments on #20909 or its kin about how having 3 directory guards
prevented #20499 from causing major chaos on the network.
>Also, the patch only supports multiple entry guards when it comes to
primary guards, and does not try to generalize the logic to the other
guard picking cases.
The choice that multiple entry guards only applies to primary guards was
intentional, since if we're ever prevented from using all our primary
guards, we want to be cautious about using more guards.
>A spec patch is definitely useful for this.
Can do, once we decide we should do something like this.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/20831#comment:7>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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