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Re: [tor-bugs] #21056 [Core Tor/Tor]: Could not pick one of the responsible hidden service directories, because we requested them all recently without success.
#21056: Could not pick one of the responsible hidden service directories, because
we requested them all recently without success.
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Reporter: joeyh | Owner:
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version: Tor: 0.2.9.8
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: tor-hs | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
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Comment (by s7r):
I confirm this happens heavily on git master with otherwise available up
and running onion services. It only happens when you open more ( > 1 )
concurrent socks requests (either to different hidden services or to the
same hidden service with isolation).
I won't attach another debug log because this is very easy to reproduce:
just open at least 2 or 3 socks requests simultaneously to the same up and
running hidden service but use a different socks username / password for
each request so they are isolated. The hidden service will become
unreachable immediately, because Tor will think it tried all HSDirs and
couldn't get a valid descriptor. It works normally if you make just one
request at a time, but it's clearly a bug.
I can also confirm this wasn't happening in previous releases (could have
been introduced with a socks patch). I used the same script to open many
concurrent rendezvous circuits to the same onion service to stress test
OnionBalance back then and I didn't experience this bug.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/21056#comment:2>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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