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Re: [tor-bugs] #10777 [Tor]: Remotely triggerable circuit destruction by path bias code
#10777: Remotely triggerable circuit destruction by path bias code
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Reporter: cypherpunks | Owner:
Type: defect | Status: closed
Priority: major | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.4.x-final
Component: Tor | Version:
Resolution: fixed | Keywords: tor-client regression
Actual Points: | Parent ID:
Points: |
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Comment (by mikeperry):
Replying to [comment:21 cypherpunks]:
> >We only return INTERNAL if the decryption itself fails, not for
unrecognized. Still digging for other cases...
> All working end stream reasons can be sent only after success relay cell
decryption. Exit or AP can't to send relay_end if digest or 'recognized'
field was wrong. Any STREAM END reason, including
END_STREAM_REASON_INTERNAL and END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL. Exit sends
end stream (it's not circuit!) only if plain text was invalid for some
reasons.
>
> If you believe tagging attack can be undetectable by honest exit node
during digest checking, why do you think checking end stream reason have
any sense?
I don't think that. I was asking if Nick might think that. I think we're
both going on the assumption that the recognized digest is strong enough
to trust for this purpose, and so it is fine to remove the INTERNAL
response. I did not check that there are no other ways to generate the
other reasons though. It seems like you might be able get TORPROTOCOL if
you messed with a relay cell such that it didn't cause the circuit to
fail.
Causing the stream to fail such that it is retried on a new circuit
(without failing the old one) is still a source for path bias, though.
Even if Tor doesn't retry that stream, there is a high likelihood that the
client will.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10777#comment:26>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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