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Re: [tor-bugs] #21415 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor_bug_occurred_: Bug: src/or/entrynodes.c:1845: select_entry_guard_for_circuit: Non-fatal assertion !(!guard_has_descriptor(guard)) failed.
#21415: tor_bug_occurred_: Bug: src/or/entrynodes.c:1845:
select_entry_guard_for_circuit: Non-fatal assertion
!(!guard_has_descriptor(guard)) failed.
-----------------------------+------------------------------------
Reporter: cypherpunks | Owner: nickm
Type: defect | Status: needs_review
Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version: Tor: 0.3.0.3-alpha
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: review-group-16 | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
Reviewer: asn | Sponsor:
-----------------------------+------------------------------------
Comment (by teor):
Replying to [comment:15 nickm]:
> Either that, or just adding 1 to num_primary?
Circuits can be up to 8 hops long in pathological cases:
Having only 2 primary guards with descriptors fails in the scenario where
we pick one guard as the exit, and the other as the middle.
Having only 3 primary guards with descriptors fails in the scenario where
we cannibalise a circuit, and one guard is the exit, and the others are
middles.
Having only 3 to (max_intro_points + 2) = 12 primary guards with
descriptors fails in the scenario where a client fails to connect to an
intro point, and so it extends to the next intro point repeatedly, up to
10 intro points. Of course, we're only allowed to send 8 RELAY_EARLY
cells, so this is bounded by the maximum path length.
Really, we need to check that we have path_length primary guards with
descriptors available, or if we don't know the path length at this point,
max_path_length. And we should BUG out if the actual path length is
greater than this.
> And in this case, should we leave the BUG() check in for now?
Oh gosh yes!
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/21415#comment:16>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
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