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Re: [tor-bugs] #24456 [Core Tor/Tor]: Figure out what to do with the guardfraction feature
#24456: Figure out what to do with the guardfraction feature
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Reporter: asn | Owner: (none)
Type: defect | Status:
| needs_review
Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor:
| 0.3.3.x-final
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: tor-dirauth, tor-guard, review- | Actual Points:
group-32 |
Parent ID: | Points: 2
Reviewer: mikeperry | Sponsor:
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Comment (by mikeperry):
After catching up on the related bugs (#13297, #16255), it seems like the
reason this is being killed is because of the lack of unit test support to
take in all inputs for a consensus (votes, bw auth files, guardfraction
files) and produce a consensus, and then examine that consensus for
expected results for both values and client usage. If we had that, it
would be much easier to verify that the fix in #16255 is sufficient,
right?
If that is true, then I would rather obsolete the torrc options for now
without removing any code, and file a ticket for better consensus testing
support. There have been several other path selection tickets where I
wished I just had a full consensus to check behavior against, rather than
cobbling together a mock or tiny chutney network...
Once we have such a testing mechanism, it will be much easier to bring
this code back with torrc options like GuardFractionV2File (since in
#16255 we already discussed changing the format slightly), rather than
ripping it out and starting over completely from scratch. We need the
guardfraction feature (or something like it) less since we have backed off
from infinite guard lifetimes, but I don't think the need is now zero.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/24456#comment:14>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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