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Re: [tor-bugs] #29174 [Core Tor/Tor]: Guard Node can eclipse the hidden service
#29174: Guard Node can eclipse the hidden service
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Reporter: TBD.Chen | Owner: (none)
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: Very High | Milestone:
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version: Tor: 0.3.0.1-alpha
Severity: Critical | Resolution:
Keywords: guard, hidden service | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
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Comment (by TBD.Chen):
Hi, I have deeply investigate the Proposal 291(291-two-guard-nodes),
292(292-mesh-vanguards), however, this problem is not mentioned by them.
So, can I get a TROVE-id or CVE-id for this bug track? Which can eclipse
hidden services stealthily :)
Replying to [comment:3 mikeperry]:
> Interesting. This is another argument for Proposal 291 in my mind. A
single guard has too much power to induce DoS and other downtime signals
like this. The vanguards addon should similarly mitigate this attack, as
it uses 2 guards by default. The malicious guard would just cause
introduce1 timeouts on clients, but not be able to mount a full "eclipse"
DoS attack.
>
> As for path bias -- it was designed to detect circuit failures caused by
the guard. This case is different because the circuit can become live and
successfully used for one or more initial introduce1 cells, and thus path
bias system will deem it successfully used. After that point, there is no
way for a client to determine if the circuit has just gone quiet because
no one is using the HS vs the guard simply not sending any more introduce1
cells on the circuit.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/29174#comment:7>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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