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[tor-bugs] #4957 [Metrics Data Processor]: Decide how to sanitize pluggable transport lines in bridge descriptors
#4957: Decide how to sanitize pluggable transport lines in bridge descriptors
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Reporter: karsten | Owner: karsten
Type: task | Status: new
Priority: normal | Milestone:
Component: Metrics Data Processor | Version:
Keywords: | Parent:
Points: | Actualpoints:
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We're providing [https://metrics.torproject.org/formats.html#bridgedesc
sanitized versions] of bridge descriptors in almost real-time on the
[https://metrics.torproject.org/data.html#bridgedesc metrics website] and
via rsync.
Once we enable bridges to include pluggable transport information in their
server and/or extra-info descriptors, we need to come up with a way to
sanitize the sensitive parts. We'll want to remove any keys contained in
pluggable transport lines, okay. But maybe the fact that a bridge offers
a specific pluggable transport is already sensitive? Maybe the fact that
it offers ''any'' pluggable transport is sensitive?
This problem came up in #3589. Bridge clients aren't supposed to learn
about pluggable transports contained in the bridge's extra-info
descriptor. Neither the bridge authority nor the bridge gives out extra-
info descriptors. But once the client knows the bridge's server
descriptor it can easily look up the ''sanitized'' extra-info descriptor
from the metrics archives. If we don't want the client to learn about the
bridge's transports, we need to take that into account. If it helps, we
can define new sanitizing rules for each pluggable transport there is.
So, there's a trade-off between revealing too much information and being
able to analyze pluggable transport deployment. We'll probably want to
run some analyses on pluggable transport deployment. We can only do that
if the information is contained in the sanitized versions of bridge
descriptors (because we don't use the original descriptors for analysis at
all).
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/4957>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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