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Re: [tor-bugs] #14224 [Tor]: Two minutes after a failed hidserv connection, we do a bonus hsdesc fetch

#14224: Two minutes after a failed hidserv connection, we do a bonus hsdesc fetch
------------------------+------------------------------
     Reporter:  arma    |      Owner:
         Type:  defect  |     Status:  new
     Priority:  normal  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
    Component:  Tor     |    Version:
   Resolution:          |   Keywords:  SponsorR, tor-hs
Actual Points:          |  Parent ID:
       Points:          |
------------------------+------------------------------

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Hrm, the fix is quite straight forward by adding a check in
 {{{rend_client_introduction_acked()}}} but the second part of '''not'''
 triggering an HS fetch, there are multiple ways of doing that, wondering
 what would be ideal.

 {{{circuit_mark_for_close()}}} checks at the circuit purpose to know if it
 has to report an intro point failure which we don't want here else it will
 trigger a fetch. Here is what I'm thinking:

 1) Before closing the intro circuit, change purpose to
 {{{CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACKED}}} which is in a way true since we
 got a negative ACK thus not triggering a intro point report failure and
 fetch desc.

 2) Flag in {{{rend_data_t}}} that tells us that no more intro points are
 usable if set (only client side).

 3) Flag the circuit but yuk...

 I'll go for 1) here for simplicity and also make sense "codeflow wise".

 Note that {{{rend_client_report_intro_point_failure()}}} triggers a HS
 fetch if there are no more usable intro points so once we got the third
 NACK (considering 3 intro points at the beginning), a fetch will
 automatically be triggered but at least the "close intro circuit" will not
 trigger one as well.

 See branch {{{bug14224_025_v1}}} in my repo for 1).

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/14224#comment:3>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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