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[tor-bugs] #21155 [- Select a component]: Similar to #14917: Client's choice of rend point can leak info about guard(s) of misconfigured hidden services with EntryNodes option
#21155: Similar to #14917: Client's choice of rend point can leak info about
guard(s) of misconfigured hidden services with EntryNodes option
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Reporter: Jaym | Owner:
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: Medium | Milestone:
Component: - Select a component | Version: Tor: unspecified
Severity: Normal | Keywords:
Actual Points: | Parent ID:
Points: | Reviewer:
Sponsor: |
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Hello !
I discovered #14917 while configuring an onion service with the EntryNodes
option set. I believe (after checking the tor-0.2.9.8 source code) that a
similar problem arises when the EntryNodes option is set AND the operator
configures entry nodes that are part of the same family or the same /16.
(let's say that the operator configures the service with 2 of its own
guard nodes running in the same cloud provider, thinking this move is
wise). Then this happens:
- When someone use a RDV point of the same family or the same /16 than the
onion's guards, then as you said: "entry_list_is_constrained() is true, so
populate_live_entry_guards() will happily return an empty list if your one
choice is inappropriate, resulting in choose_random_entry_impl() returning
NULL".
Is there a reason why we do not check family, /16 and user
misconfiguration ? "EntryNodes fingerprint1, fingerprint1" works just fine
for example. What do you think ?
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/21155>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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