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Re: [tor-bugs] #21284 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add torrc option for non-anonymous SocksPort
#21284: Add torrc option for non-anonymous SocksPort
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Reporter: teor | Owner:
Type: enhancement | Status: new
Priority: Very Low | Milestone: Tor: very
| long term
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: tor-hs, single-onion, wontfix? | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points: 1
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
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Comment (by teor):
Replying to [comment:9 teor]:
> Replying to [comment:6 alecmuffett]:
> > In terms of use cases, the goal is to simplify OnionBalance adoption
to drive scale; anyone who is running Single Hop Circuits is unlikely to
care about remaining anonymous, so it seems odd to ban them from SOCKS
merely to drive the point home?
>
> As s7r noted, Exits already ban single-hop circuits, so if we had
naïvely allowed a single-hop SOCKSPort, it might only have worked when
accessing onion services as a client. Which would have been a terrible
user experience.
I checked the code:
* the single onion service code only changes service intro and rend
circuits, and
* Tor2Web only changes client intro and rend circuits.
So exits remain 3-hop regardless, and would work ok if you used the
--enable-tor2web-mode workaround (or any option we might add that does the
same thing).
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/21284#comment:11>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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