[tor-bugs] #12715 [Tor Browser]: Treat fingerprinting fixes like other security fixes: trigger TBB release

["Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki" <blackhole@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

#12715: Treat fingerprinting fixes like other security fixes: trigger TBB release
--------------------------------+--------------------------
 Reporter:  cypherpunks         |          Owner:  tbb-team
     Type:  task                |         Status:  new
 Priority:  normal              |      Milestone:
Component:  Tor Browser         |        Version:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                      |         Points:
--------------------------------+--------------------------
 Proposal: Treat anti-fingerprinting bugfixes like any other security
 bugfix with regards to prioritization and release management.

 For instance, when an anti-fingerprinting fix lands in git, whether as a
 Tor Button update or as a mere Tor Browser default pref change, this
 should trigger a new Tor Browser Bundle release incorporating the fix,
 even if no other component needs updating.

 Deanonymizing users through fingerprint leaks is becoming a realistic
 threat as the advertising industry consolidates and transforms itself into
 a tracking industry offering advertising as a sort of higher layer
 service. And we should assume that all kinds of other adversaries are
 already closely watching the tbb-fingerprinting tag.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/12715>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
_______________________________________________
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs