[Author Prev][Author Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Author Index][Thread Index]
[tor-bugs] #31075 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Consider dropping browser patch for 26353
#31075: Consider dropping browser patch for 26353
------------------------------------------+----------------------
Reporter: acat | Owner: tbb-team
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: Medium | Milestone:
Component: Applications/Tor Browser | Version:
Severity: Normal | Keywords: ff68-esr
Actual Points: | Parent ID:
Points: | Reviewer:
Sponsor: |
------------------------------------------+----------------------
I think the patch for #26353 is not strictly needed, since the speculative
connections are blocked when a proxy is configured (here:
https://github.com/mozilla/gecko-
dev/blob/esr60/netwerk/base/nsIOService.cpp#L1621, and same in 68). So
while the speculative requests can be seen in torbutton domain-isolator,
they should be dropped before they reach tor client.
I tested by changing the torbutton code to not put all these to the
`--unknown--` catch-all circuit so that they could be tracked, and while I
can see these in logs coming from the domain isolator, there are no
corresponding open circuits in the `Torbutton INFO: controlPort << getinfo
circuit-status` logs.
It's always possible that this might change in the future (according to
the comments in that file, the reason why the speculative connections are
not performed when there is a proxy do not seem so strong). So we might
still want the current patch for #26353 just in case, I'm not sure.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/31075>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
_______________________________________________
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs