Re: [tor-bugs] #22689 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Stop rend and intro points being used as single hop proxies

["Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki" <blackhole@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

#22689: prop224: Stop rend and intro points being used as single hop proxies
-----------------------------------+------------------------------------
 Reporter:  teor                   |          Owner:
     Type:  defect                 |         Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium                 |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor           |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                 |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, relay-safety  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #17945                 |         Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:                         |        Sponsor:
-----------------------------------+------------------------------------
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => needs_revision


Old description:

> This prevents them knowing both the service and client IP addresses, and
> therefore being targets for network traffic logging, sybil, or hacking
> attacks.
>
> We need to implement the following checks:
> * if the introduction point was made using a direct connection (single
> onion services), refuse direct client connections,
> * if the rend point was made using a direct connection (custom client, no
> tor2web for HSv3), refuse direct service connections (single onion
> services).
>
> See #22668 for how this is done for HSDir3s using channel_is_client().
> The comments in that patch explain why it works.
>
> We could even refactor the common code out of
> connection_dir_is_anonymous() into connection_is_anonymous(), and avoid
> including channel[tls].h into directory.c.
>
> I'm not sure if I will get time to do this, so please feel free to take
> this ticket.

New description:

 This prevents them knowing both the service and client IP addresses, and
 therefore being targets for network traffic logging, sybil, or hacking
 attacks.

 We need to implement the following checks:
 * if the introduction point was made using a direct connection (single
 onion services), refuse direct client connections,
 * if the rend point was made using a direct connection (custom client, no
 tor2web for HSv3), refuse direct service connections (single onion
 services).

 See #22688 for how this is done for HSDir3s using channel_is_client(). The
 comments in that patch explain why it works.

 We could even refactor the common code out of
 connection_dir_is_anonymous() into connection_is_anonymous(), and avoid
 including channel[tls].h into directory.c.

 I'm not sure if I will get time to do this, so please feel free to take
 this ticket.

--

Comment:

 See cddff59c0 in my branch bug22688-031 for code that might work for OR
 circuits.
 (I accidentally wrote the OR version rather than the directory version.)

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/22689#comment:2>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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