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Re: [tor-bugs] #17857 [Core Tor/Tor]: Create a consensus param to disable (netflow) padding if RSOS is enabled
#17857: Create a consensus param to disable (netflow) padding if RSOS is enabled
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Reporter: teor | Owner: mikeperry
Type: enhancement | Status: needs_revision
Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: tor-hs, single-onion | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points: 1
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
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Changes (by teor):
* status: needs_review => needs_revision
Comment:
Replying to [comment:29 mikeperry]:
> I added a fixup to use the rend_service accessor.
Thanks!
There's a redundant check of `get_options()->HiddenServiceSingleHopMode`
in channel_do_open_actions():
{{{
- || (get_options()->HiddenServiceSingleHopMode &&
+ || (rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection(get_options()) &&
+ get_options()->HiddenServiceSingleHopMode &&
}}}
Once that's fixed, please flip the ticket to merge_ready.
> For the rest of it, we're a bit late in the game to decide that we want
to have a new negotiation mechanism to disable one-ended padding.
Furthermore, if the padding overhead starts crushing us even before all
clients and relays have upgraded to use padding fully yet, we should just
disable the entire netflow padding feature and figure out how to deal with
that problem, rather than polluting the code with more complicated kill
switches and negotiation methods based on guesses about what might cause
problems, especially for issues that will only be a problem for a short
period of time.
Yes, that would require HSDirs and Intro Points and Rend Points to know
when they are connected to a single onion service or Tor2web, which is
possible (except for single onion -> HSDir, which is 3 hops). But that
code hasn't been written yet (see #22688 and #22689). And then we'd need
to add another kill switch for these cases.
If you don't think that's necessary, that's ok. But it could be a year or
two before this code is running on most single onion services. And we
might deprecate v2 hidden services and Tor2web before it's ever running on
most Tor2web instances.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17857#comment:30>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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