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Re: [tor-bugs] #19009 [Core Tor/Tor]: bandwidth testing circuits should be allowed to use our guards
#19009: bandwidth testing circuits should be allowed to use our guards
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Reporter: arma | Owner: (none)
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor:
| unspecified
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: tor-bandwidth torflow measurement | Actual Points:
metrics |
Parent ID: #25925 | Points:
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
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Comment (by juga):
It is not anymore the case where the code "avoid our guards if all the
nodes in the consensus are on our guard list" [0]
> teor fixed that in commit 22a1e9cac by making us not avoid our guards if
testingtornetwork, and not avoid our guards if all the nodes in the
consensus are on our guard list. It turns out that latter check isn't
quite good enough, because we're picking two hops, so having at least one
relay in the network that isn't in our guard list isn't enough to complete
a circuit.
The 2nd hop can be in the guard list right?
The 2nd hop seems to be picked by `choose_good_middle_server`, called by
`choose_good_entry_server`
I can find the code where 2 hops are being picked.
Running chutney, circuits build 3 hops. There's also no test for this.
> I hope this is eventually obsoleted by torflow or some successor
thereof.
hmm, i think this does not have to do with a bandwidth scanner, but with
Tor self-test.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/19009#comment:8>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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