Re: [tor-bugs] #29646 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript XSS user choices are persisted

["Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki" <blackhole@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

#29646: NoScript XSS user choices are persisted
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
 Reporter:  atac                                 |          Owner:  tbb-
                                                 |  team
     Type:  defect                               |         Status:  new
 Priority:  High                                 |      Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser             |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-disk-leak xss noscript tbb-      |  Actual Points:
  newnym ux-team                                 |
Parent ID:                                       |         Points:
 Reviewer:                                       |        Sponsor:
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: antonela (added)
 * keywords:  tbb-disk-leak xss noscript tbb-newnym => tbb-disk-leak xss
     noscript tbb-newnym ux-team


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:5 ma1]:
 > I could add a checkbox "[ ] Forget my choice at the end of this session"
 which would be pre-checked for incognito tabs and in the Tor Browser
 (keeping this setting just in memory, without persistence), unchecked
 otherwise.
 > Would this work?

 This sounds like an improvement, thanks! I am not convinced yet that we
 should have this option checked by default, though. Here is my current
 thinking:
 {{{
 13:34 <+GeKo> my current thinking is that we should try to stick to two
 choices
 13:34 <+GeKo> and the default selected one is the per-site exception as it
 is right
               now
 13:35 <+GeKo> and then the second option would bewhat ma1 suggest if we
 are in
               privtae browsing mode
 13:35 <+GeKo> or if we are not in that mode we'd get what we currently
 have
 13:35 <+GeKo> i wonder whether the noscript ui could be that flexible,
 though
 13:36 <+GeKo> the risk with ma1's proposal is that we make it easy to
 fingerprint
               users
 13:36 <+GeKo> sure
 13:37 <+GeKo> because as soon as you have (say, by accident) whitelist
 some xss
               request
 13:38 <+GeKo> for the session it is detectable by any other website by
 embedding
               similar requests
 }}}
 Adding antonela for UX input.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/29646#comment:6>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online

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