[Author Prev][Author Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Author Index][Thread Index]

Re: [tor-bugs] #2667 [Tor Relay]: Exits should block reentry into the tor network

#2667: Exits should block reentry into the tor network
-----------------------+----------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:  mikeperry  |          Owner:       
     Type:  defect     |         Status:  new  
 Priority:  normal     |      Milestone:       
Component:  Tor Relay  |        Version:       
 Keywords:             |         Parent:  #2664
   Points:             |   Actualpoints:       
-----------------------+----------------------------------------------------

Comment(by mikeperry):

 I think it still makes this worth while. If the adversary has to now use
 bridges and proxies, we've still imposed a bound on their resources, even
 if it if it is a very high bound. Proxies are not very stable, and bridges
 are designed to be hard to obtain in unlimited quantity.

 The attack would go from requiring just a modem to destroy the tor network
 to requiring a modem + enough stable proxy and bridge bandwidth to destroy
 it. I think this is an improvement.

 Of course, it depends on how hard this is to implement. I suspect that it
 should just be a day or two of hacking, at most, right?

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2667#comment:2>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
_______________________________________________
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs