Re: [tor-bugs] #2709 [Tor Relay]: Relays can trick authorities into assigning the hsdir flag early

["Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki" <torproject-admin@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

#2709: Relays can trick authorities into assigning the hsdir flag early
-----------------------+----------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:  Sebastian  |          Owner:                    
     Type:  defect     |         Status:  needs_review      
 Priority:  normal     |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.2.x-final
Component:  Tor Relay  |        Version:                    
 Keywords:             |         Parent:                    
   Points:             |   Actualpoints:                    
-----------------------+----------------------------------------------------

Comment(by Sebastian):

 Replying to [comment:3 nickm]:
 > Reviewing the patch:
 >
 >   * I want to clarify the changes file to specify the attack a little
 more accurately.
 >   * I want to avoid a the possibility of negative uptimes.
 >
 > I've pushed a tweak to a hsdir_assignment branch in my public
 repository.

 The fixes look good to me.

 > Another security measure: perhaps the authorities should simply not
 allow more than N identities per IP per time-unit.  If a router is
 frequently changing its identity, it's probably up to no good.  Worth
 writing a proposal there.

 I disagree here. New relay operators that experience some problem often
 wipe their keys frequently, and also people might share the same IP
 address if they get one assigned on the fly. I suppose this should be out
 of scope here, and be discussed in a proposal if it happens.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2709#comment:4>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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