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[tor-bugs] #25536 [Internal Services/Schleuder]: Build (and document) a set of habits around our schleuder replies



#25536: Build (and document) a set of habits around our schleuder replies
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     Reporter:  arma                         |      Owner:  hiro
         Type:  defect                       |     Status:  new
     Priority:  Medium                       |  Milestone:
    Component:  Internal Services/Schleuder  |    Version:
     Severity:  Normal                       |   Keywords:
Actual Points:                               |  Parent ID:
       Points:                               |   Reviewer:
      Sponsor:                               |
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 The tor-security@ list is set up using schleuder:
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/emailLists#AdministrativeLists

 Generally people send mail to it unencrypted and unsigned, I guess because
 pgp is hard.

 When I reply to the mails, I've been manually pasting the original sender
 onto the To: address, and switching my reply from the default encrypted
 back to unencrypted so the mail can go to the original sender (I don't
 have their key after all). It looks like other people are following a
 similar pattern.

 But intrigeri tells me that there are secret directives you can give to
 schleuder, like x-resend, that might allow me to ask schleuder to handle
 the mail delivery:
 https://schleuder.nadir.org/docs/#using-a-list

 Should we be using that directive and then encrypting the mail to
 schleuder? Does it work? is there something better we should be doing?

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/25536>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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