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[tor-bugs] Re: [Tor Bug Tracker] #1136: When Tor is offline, it doesn't quite run out of relays, so doesn't realize it's offline
#1136: When Tor is offline, it doesn't quite run out of relays, so doesn't realize
it's offline
-----------------------------+----------------------------------------------
Reporter: arma | Owner: mikeperry
Type: defect | Status: assigned
Priority: major | Milestone:
Component: Tor-Tor client | Version: 0.2.1.19
Resolution: None | Keywords:
-----------------------------+----------------------------------------------
Changes (by mikeperry):
* status: new => assigned
* owner: => mikeperry
Old description:
> If your Tor client goes offline, it will keep trying to establish
> circuits,
> and as each TLS connection fails, it will mark that relay down.
>
> In update_router_have_minimum_dir_info() Tor checks whether (num_present
> < 2)
> but we never actually mark down the last few relays, either because we
> don't
> have enough left to make a circuit so we don't ever try another TLS
> connection,
> or because none of the remaining relays are suitable exit nodes so we
> can't
> pick a path that would be a useful circuit so we don't try.
>
> I think we need to catch the case where we failed to pick a path because
> we
> don't have enough circuits, and if it case occurs and many of our relays
> are
> marked down, we should mark them up.
>
> That will cause us to attempt circuits for a lot longer than currently,
> but on
> the other hand Tor will actually work when you come back to the network
> and
> try to make a new application request.
>
> [Automatically added by flyspray2trac: Operating System: All]
New description:
If your Tor client goes offline, it will keep trying to establish
circuits,
and as each TLS connection fails, it will mark that relay down.
In update_router_have_minimum_dir_info() Tor checks whether (num_present <
2)
but we never actually mark down the last few relays, either because we
don't
have enough left to make a circuit so we don't ever try another TLS
connection,
or because none of the remaining relays are suitable exit nodes so we
can't
pick a path that would be a useful circuit so we don't try.
I think we need to catch the case where we failed to pick a path because
we
don't have enough circuits, and if it case occurs and many of our relays
are
marked down, we should mark them up.
That will cause us to attempt circuits for a lot longer than currently,
but on
the other hand Tor will actually work when you come back to the network
and
try to make a new application request.
[Automatically added by flyspray2trac: Operating System: All]
--
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/1136#comment:6>
Tor Bug Tracker <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online