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Re: [tor-bugs] #12064 [Tor]: Tor should be able to read all files it creates when Sandbox enabled.
#12064: Tor should be able to read all files it creates when Sandbox enabled.
---------------------------+--------------------------------
Reporter: alphawolf | Owner: nickm
Type: defect | Status: reopened
Priority: normal | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.5.x-final
Component: Tor | Version: Tor: 0.2.5.4-alpha
Resolution: | Keywords: sandbox
Actual Points: | Parent ID:
Points: |
---------------------------+--------------------------------
Changes (by alphawolf):
* status: closed => reopened
* resolution: fixed =>
Comment:
I'm getting a stack trace on the hidden services. I thought it was
because of the trailing '/' on `HiddenServiceDir`, but it seems to happen
even when I get rid of that. The only difference is that the '/' is not
doubled up in the bug message as it is below. Note, this only happens
after HUP.
{{{
HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/hidden_service/
HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80
}}}
{{{
May 22 22:01:24.000 [notice] Received reload signal (hup). Reloading
config and resetting internal state.
May 22 22:01:24.000 [notice] Read configuration file "/usr/share/tor/tor-
service-defaults-torrc".
May 22 22:01:24.000 [notice] Read configuration file "/etc/tor/torrc".
May 22 22:01:24.000 [notice] Tor 0.2.5.4-alpha-dev (git-cfd0ee514c279bc6)
opening log file.
May 22 22:01:24.000 [warn] sandbox_intern_string(): Bug: No interned
sandbox parameter found for /var/lib/tor/hidden_service/
May 22 22:01:24.000 [warn] sandbox_intern_string(): Bug: No interned
sandbox parameter found for /var/lib/tor/hidden_service//hostname.tmp
============================================================ T= 1400810484
(Sandbox) Caught a bad syscall attempt (syscall open)
/usr/bin/tor(+0x1239aa)[0x7f0e05c959aa]
/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libpthread.so.0(open64+0x10)[0x7f0e04778180]
/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libpthread.so.0(open64+0x10)[0x7f0e04778180]
/usr/bin/tor(tor_open_cloexec+0x40)[0x7f0e05c82360]
/usr/bin/tor(start_writing_to_file+0xfb)[0x7f0e05c90f7b]
/usr/bin/tor(+0x11f0db)[0x7f0e05c910db]
/usr/bin/tor(+0x11f228)[0x7f0e05c91228]
/usr/bin/tor(+0x5a218)[0x7f0e05bcc218]
/usr/bin/tor(rend_service_load_all_keys+0x81)[0x7f0e05bce231]
/usr/bin/tor(set_options+0xb9a)[0x7f0e05c2e4ba]
/usr/bin/tor(options_init_from_string+0x2d9)[0x7f0e05c2fcf9]
/usr/bin/tor(options_init_from_torrc+0x1a7)[0x7f0e05c2fff7]
/usr/bin/tor(process_signal+0x46c)[0x7f0e05ba93ac]
/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-
gnu/libevent-2.0.so.5(event_base_loop+0x9a5)[0x7f0e051fe715]
/usr/bin/tor(do_main_loop+0x195)[0x7f0e05ba8285]
/usr/bin/tor(tor_main+0xd75)[0x7f0e05baa6e5]
/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xf5)[0x7f0e041dcb45]
/usr/bin/tor(+0x32adb)[0x7f0e05ba4adb]
}}}
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/12064#comment:8>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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