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[tor-bugs] #7430 [Tor Check]: Easy MITM against check.tpo (not SSL-related)
#7430: Easy MITM against check.tpo (not SSL-related)
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Reporter: cypherpunks | Owner:
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: major | Milestone:
Component: Tor Check | Version:
Keywords: | Parent:
Points: | Actualpoints:
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check.tpo is there to give users with a bad setup a fighting chance of
getting warned when they aren't actually proxying their requests through
the the Tor network, right?
So it would be in the interest of a malicious network operator to make it
seem like the broken Tor setup is just fine, filling those users with
false confidence.
What would stop such a malicious network operator from looking for TCP
requests to one of the IP addresses of check.tpo and transparently
proxying ''just those requests'' through Tor?
Note that SSL can do nothing at all to stop that, as the content of the
request is never inspected or modified.
I've never seen that particular attack discussed anywhere, and it would be
very easy to implement.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7430>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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