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Re: [tor-bugs] #7520 [BridgeDB]: Design and implement a social distributor for BridgeDB
#7520: Design and implement a social distributor for BridgeDB
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Reporter: aagbsn | Owner:
Type: enhancement | Status: new
Priority: normal | Milestone:
Component: BridgeDB | Version:
Keywords: | Parent:
Points: | Actualpoints:
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Changes (by phw):
* cc: phw (added)
Comment:
I feel like we need to provide incentives for people to actually give
bridges to friends. From an egoistic point of view: why would they do
that? Distributing bridges to other people increases the probability of
the bridge getting blocked and the system classifying you as a "bad user"
(I'm a pessimist).
Another problem might be the first node in the invitation graph: the users
who receive bridges first. If we only have a small set of trusted people,
the entire system might be ineffective. If we have some automated way to
handle this, then we can expect large-scale sybil attacks like the
bridges.tpo crawling.
Some papers which thought about models for this problem:
http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#proximax11
http://www.cs.kau.se/philwint/censorbib/#Mahdian2010
http://www.cs.kau.se/philwint/censorbib/#Sovran2008
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7520#comment:2>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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