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Re: [tor-bugs] #7520 [BridgeDB]: Design and implement a social distributor for BridgeDB
#7520: Design and implement a social distributor for BridgeDB
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Reporter: aagbsn | Owner:
Type: enhancement | Status: new
Priority: normal | Milestone:
Component: BridgeDB | Version:
Keywords: SponsorL | Parent:
Points: | Actualpoints:
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Comment(by aagbsn):
Ah, so one thing that Proximax does is evaluate users of the system by a
metric "user-hours", referred to as yield, in order to figure out how to
allocate a sparse set of bridges effectively.
BridgeDB already obtains the extra-info field bridge-ips for each bridge,
which consists of approximate user-counts per country.
BridgeDB also learns which bridges are blocked by parsing a file, however,
we don't yet produce this list of blocked bridges. Also, the file format
does not include a timestamp field, and blocking events are grouped into a
single line. If we want to extrapolate bridge availability we will
probably want a more descriptive format, and BridgeDB should learn to
track some sort of per-country availabile-uptime metric.
Alternately, we could extract yield entirely from the bridge-ips line by
tracking users seen over time. This could be manipulated by a dishonest
bridge operator, or an attacker who generates traffic to known bridges to
boost their ranking and obtain more trust in this system.
I'm not sure what we can do about this. Are there other ways to estimate
bridge usage without just trusting the bridge self-reporting?
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7520#comment:5>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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