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[tor-bugs] #10239 [BridgeDB]: Payment for bridges (and effects this would have)
#10239: Payment for bridges (and effects this would have)
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Reporter: tmp | Owner:
Type: project | Status: new
Priority: normal | Milestone:
Component: BridgeDB | Version:
Keywords: | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
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It is theoretically possible to accept payment (e.g. via bitcion) and use
this payment to set up a custom bridge. This bridge would then only be
shared with the identity that has made payment for it.
There are a few advantages to handing out bridges in this way:
- This method of handing out bridges is non-exhaustive. The more bridge
requests come in, the more bridges will be created.
- The bridge will be shared with one identity exclusively and will be used
at their discretion. It becomes more difficult to block the user of a
bridge.
- Bitcoin is being traded in Iran, China, etc.
- No need to search for a working bridge every week. (I assume this is an
issue?).
Some disadvantages:
- This method is undemocratic. Privacy would become better for those with
more resources.
- This method centralizes power when it becomes the main method to get a
bridge. In the event that this method becomes popular, more parties might
implement this scheme. Some state might start to issue payed-for bridges
(at a competitive rate) to a significant amount of users, and then kill
all the bridges at their discretion. Not sure how much of an issue this
would be in practice.
Possible side-effect:
- More capital control. Although in the case of China, bitcoin will
probably not be blocked.
Open questions:
- Can it be automated to create unique bridges? (That are not all in the
same block).
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10239>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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