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Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: kz no need tor, tor no need kz, if anybody want they can to use ultrasurf. cyberoam assists bloody dictatorships.
#20348: kz no need tor, tor no need kz, if anybody want they can to use ultrasurf.
cyberoam assists bloody dictatorships.
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Reporter: dcf | Owner:
Type: project | Status: closed
Priority: Medium | Milestone:
Component: Metrics/Censorship analysis | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution: invalid
Keywords: censorship block kz | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
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Comment (by dcf):
Replying to [comment:91 cypherpunks]:
> > There could be another cause: for example suppose all the DPI boxes
count connections to each IP address and upload the logs to a central
place, then the firewalls only apply their timing/entropy heuristics to
popular destinations. It wouldn't surprise me if a firewall vendor were
uploading customer connection logs in order to do data mining on them.
>
> They no need to send it to central place, box can to count connections
locally to skip all new addr:port. But then why need to count entropy
every time for already known addr:port? Why so complex?
The reason I mentioned sending logs to a central place is that the tor-
talk commenter said that for them, too, well-used bridges were detected
and unused bridges were not detected. I assumed that they did not have a
lot of other users behind the firewall that were increasing connection
counts for the default bridges, but I could be wrong about that
assumption.
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2016-November/042592.html
It might be just a blacklist that all firewalls share. Even then, I can't
explain why they would seemingly be checking entropy and doing a lot of
work, rather than just blocking the endpoints.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/20348#comment:100>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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