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Re: [tor-bugs] #23170 [Core Tor/Tor]: Include ed25519 relay id keys in the consensus
#23170: Include ed25519 relay id keys in the consensus
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Reporter: asn | Owner: nickm
Type: task | Status:
| needs_revision
Priority: Very High | Milestone: Tor:
| 0.3.3.x-final
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: tor-spec prop224 tor-dirauth tor-hs | Actual Points:
ed25519 needs-proposal TorCoreTeam201711.1 |
Parent ID: | Points: 1
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
| SponsorR-can
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Comment (by nickm):
So, one possibility to consider is to introduce another consensus flavor,
as we did before when we added microdescriptors in the first place. That
would potentially let us re-engineer a lot of stuff. Though I'm not sure
we can actually drop RSA identity keys from the consensus as long as the
legacy HS system exists, if we believe that the hash ring needs to work
like this.
For the purposes of this ticket, maybe it would make more sense to figure
out what the probability is for onion service clients/servers to
upload/download from the wrong place, and look into other ways to
constrain that. For example, we could increase the spread (as teor
recommends), or require that a certain fraction of the network be known,
or something like that.
Who knows? It may be that the problem that led to this ticket will go away
once we've solved the various pending microdescriptor download issues
(like #23985 and #23817)
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/23170#comment:16>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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