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Re: [tor-bugs] #24366 [Core Tor/Tor]: compare_vote_rs() could check more fields for better SHA1 collision resistance
#24366: compare_vote_rs() could check more fields for better SHA1 collision
resistance
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
Reporter: teor | Owner: (none)
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor:
| 0.3.3.x-final
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: tor-dirauth, possible-consensus- | Actual Points:
failure, needs-proposal |
Parent ID: | Points: 2
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
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Changes (by teor):
* keywords: tor-dirauth, possible-consensus-failure, needs-proposal? =>
tor-dirauth, possible-consensus-failure, needs-proposal
Comment:
The votes already include a better hash of the microdescriptor, but that's
probably not enough. (And they contain *multiple* microdesc hashes.)
So yes, I think the right thing to do is to:
* add a sha-best (are we at SHA3-256 now?) descriptor hash to votes
* define a new consensus method
* when using that new consensus method, use this hash as the tie-breaker
I think this lets us remove all the other tie-breaker fields.
Maybe we could just get away with comparing the sha3-256 hash, but let's
stick with the existing two hashes, and the sha3, so we don't accidentally
*reduce* security.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/24366#comment:3>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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