[Author Prev][Author Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Author Index][Thread Index]
Re: [tor-bugs] #9775 [Core Tor/Tor]: Authorities should report when they don't vote Running but some addresses are still reachable
#9775: Authorities should report when they don't vote Running but some addresses
are still reachable
------------------------------------------------+--------------------------
Reporter: arma | Owner: (none)
Type: enhancement | Status: new
Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor:
| unspecified
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: tor-dirauth logging reporting easy | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
------------------------------------------------+--------------------------
Comment (by teor):
Replying to [comment:19 teor]:
> I think this is a good change. Don't we do it already with IPv6 by
dropping the addresses in votes?
We do this, but Onionoo doesn't currently parse votes and use them for its
new unreachable_or_addresses field:
https://metrics.torproject.org/onionoo.html#details_relay_unreachable_or_addresses
So this only works for IPv6 addresses when a minority of authorities is on
IPv6.
> Or do we drop the entire relay from the vote when we drop the Running
flag?
We keep it, but vote it not Running. It only gets dropped from the
consensus.
> If I had to choose, I would prioritise relays checking their own IPv6
ORPort reachability over this change.
Also, consensus-health has a "ReachableIPv6" pseudo-flag, but doesn't
parse votes or descriptors, so it can't do "UnreachableIPv6" yet:
https://consensus-health.torproject.org/
And Relay Search (Atlas) has IPv6 ORPort and IPv6 Exit flags, but, again,
that doesn't really help:
https://atlas.torproject.org/#toprelays
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9775#comment:20>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
_______________________________________________
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs