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Re: [tor-bugs] #23247 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Communicating security expectations for .onion: what to say about different padlock states for .onion services
#23247: Communicating security expectations for .onion: what to say about different
padlock states for .onion services
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Reporter: isabela | Owner: tbb-team
Type: project | Status: new
Priority: Medium | Milestone:
Component: Applications/Tor Browser | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: ux-team | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
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Comment (by tom):
Talking about this with asn on irc the following came up. Is there is a
difference between a self-signed certificate and other types of invalid
ssl certificates?
E.g. A self-signed cert with the correct name vs a CA-signed cert with the
incorrect name.
IF we show a green icon for a self-signed cert with the correct name,
someone who is actually running a malicious onion and gets you to visit it
and change all other situations (ca-signed cert with incorrect name) to
one that gets you a green icon. So showing a warning page for any other
situation provides no security. BUT maybe it provides the webmaster with
an indicator that their server was misconfigured and is not sending the
certificate they should send?
(Alternately, maybe we don't want to send that indicator because it now
requires webmasters who have a working example.com cert and configuration
to not only deploy a .onion but deploy a new vhost pointing at the same
config and serve that vhost a separate SSL cert which is configuration
they could otherwise avoid.)
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/23247#comment:7>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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