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[tor-bugs] #28651 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Prepare all pieces of the snowflake pipeline for a second snowflake bridge
#28651: Prepare all pieces of the snowflake pipeline for a second snowflake bridge
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Reporter: arma | Owner: (none)
Type: enhancement | Status: new
Priority: Medium | Milestone:
Component: Obfuscation/Snowflake | Version:
Severity: Normal | Keywords:
Actual Points: | Parent ID:
Points: | Reviewer:
Sponsor: |
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Right now there is one snowflake bridge, and its fingerprint is hard-coded
in tor browser.
Eventually we will have enough load, and/or want more resiliency, that we
want to set up a second snowflake bridge.
To be able to do that, I think we need changes at the client, changes at
the snowflake, and changes at the broker.
(A) At the snowflake side, the snowflake needs to tell the broker which
bridge(s) it is willing to send traffic to. Additionally, we either want
to declare that each snowflake sends to only one bridge, or we need to add
a way for the client to tell the snowflake which bridge it wants to reach.
(B) At the broker side, we need it to be able to learn from snowflakes
which bridge(s) they use, and we need it to be able to learn from clients
which bridge they want to use, and we need it to match clients with
snowflakes that will reach that bridge.
(C) At the client side, we need it to tell the broker which bridge it
wants to use, and (depending on our design choice in A above) we might
also need the client to be able to tell the snowflake which bridge it
wants to use.
(There is an alternative approach, where we assume that every snowflake is
always running the newest javascript, so it is willing to reach every
bridge on our master list. Then the broker doesn't need to do anything
new, and we just need to add a way for the client to tell the snowflake
which bridge it wants. I don't have a good handle on how realistic this
assumption is.)
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/28651>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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