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[tor-bugs] #28025 [Core Tor/Torflow]: unintended consequence of geographically distributed bandwidth servers: higher vote instability
#28025: unintended consequence of geographically distributed bandwidth servers:
higher vote instability
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Reporter: starlight | Owner: tom
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: Medium | Component: Core Tor/Torflow
Version: | Severity: Normal
Keywords: | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
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The manner in which ticket #24674 was implemented has caused Torflow
voting to become increasing unstable.
IIUC Torflow switches from one configured bandwidth server to the next in
succession, but does not maintain separate sets of measurement data for
each server. Thus if a scan is performed against a server in fast region
such as central Europe and next in a slow region such as South America,
new slow measurements are compared against the fast average bandwidth
established in the preceding cycle, and vice-versa.
The moria1 scanner appears to recently have commenced operating with
multiple servers configured while the maatuska scanner remains configured
with one server. A recent synchronous pair of scan results from the two
illustrates this problem and is attached. Moria1 results show much higher
variance in pid_delta values than maatuska results: sorted by slice from
highest down
moria1 pid_delta variances:
scanner1: 2.35 2.32 1.01 1.32 0.65 0.79 0.76 0.51 1.12 0.43
scanner2: 0.97 0.94
maatuska pid_delta variances:
scanner1: 0.31 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.26 0.27 0.38 0.49 0.28 0.36 0.34
scanner2: 0.42 0.36 0.46
At a minimum SBWS should address this issue by segregating measurment data
by scanner.
For the present my opinion is that Torflow configurations should be
reverted to one-server-per scanner to reduce vote instability and restore
it to what it was before ticket #24674 was implemented.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/28025>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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